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Abstract 
 
Personal insolvency law in New Zealand has had some recent amendments that have been successful in 
reducing the number of bankruptcies. With the rise in consumer bankruptcies and insolvencies, both in 
New Zealand and internationally many historic insolvency laws and practices are outdated. 
 
Balancing the obligations of debtors with the relief of a proactive insolvency regime while satisfying 
stakeholders is difficult. If relief is too easily accessed there is a risk of abuse of the system. If relief is 
too difficult to obtain there will be unnecessary suffering and a potential loss of economic motivation 
for the insolvent. 
 
A new model of personal administration is argued as the best mechanism for maximising stakeholder 
value. Such a system if entered through a restrictive gateway would cease any concern of abuse. 
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I Introduction 
 
The purpose of my thesis is to examine the personal insolvency systems in 
New Zealand from the perspective of stakeholder value maximisation. The results of 
this examination are then compared and contrasted with other real alternative options 
like the US system of personal administration as contained in chapter 13 of its 
bankruptcy code and theoretical models. The extrapolated findings are used to 
determine whether New Zealand should adopt a version of a personal administration 
scheme or some other form of insolvency alternatives.  
 
New Zealand’s insolvency legislation is a tale of the haves and have nots. 
Corporate insolvency has many well defined processes and options open to the 
corporate insolvent. It benefited from consistent lobbying from various special 
interest groups. The net result is that New Zealand enjoys a modern corporate 
insolvency regime that is in line with its nearest trading partner Australia. Personal 
insolvency on the other hand has not enjoyed the same level of special interest 
treatment. Instead New Zealand’s personal insolvency regime is antiquated and 
remains largely the same as it was a century ago. The reforms of the Insolvency Act 
2006 started to address the growing issue of consumer bankruptcy. 
 
The lack of political will to address issues in personal insolvency is obvious 
and universal (except for the US who have been pioneers in this area). The politics of 
bankruptcy law reform has allowed bankruptcy systems “to decay due to political 
inertia, this being an area in which politicians show little interest or understanding”1. 
The issues of personal insolvency should be addressed despite the inherent challenges. 
This thesis examines the current insolvency regimes in New Zealand and questions 
whether a system of personal administration should be adopted in New Zealand along 
with broader reforms of the regime. 
 
In order to tackle this key question, personal insolvency needs to be 
understood. For the purposes of my thesis, I take the view that personal insolvency 
involves more than just the simple relationship between debtor and creditor. It 
involves many stakeholders who are all influenced by self interest. These stakeholders 
must interact within a framework underpinned by a variety of legal doctrines and 
statutes which are in turn shaped by practical economics2 which includes the concept 
of wealth maximisation. However in cases of insolvency the concept of wealth 
maximisation is inverted so that loss mitigation becomes the prevailing concept. 
                                                 
1 Joseph Spooner “Long Overdue: What The Belated Reform of Irish Insolvency Law Tells Us About 
Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy” (2012) 86 Am. Bankr. L.J. 243 at 247.   
2 Helen Anderson, “Creditors Rights of Recovery: Economic Theory, Corporate Jurisprudence and the 
Role of Fairness” (2006) 30 Melbourne U. L.R. 1.  
7 
 
 
Economic theory struggles to deal with the personal insolvency, while the 
majority of economic scholars have focused on the corporate aspect of creditor rights 
to recover unpaid debts. Personal insolvency in the post Global Financial Crisis world 
has far reaching consequences and therefore deserves robust academic research. 
 
In assessing the appropriateness of a personal administration scheme this 
thesis will adopt an argument based on utility. Stakeholders as a collective group will 
best mitigate their losses and therefore maximise their returns on personal insolvent 
estates if a utilitarian approach is adopted. A personal administration regime that 
offers ease of entry and a clean slate discharge will be championed as the best sort of 
regime, whether this is achieved through personal administration or an alternative or a 
combination of alternatives forms the heart of this thesis. Economic theory about 
resource optimisation and economic efficiency arguments will be used to support this 
position.  
 
Nebulous concepts of morality and fairness will be juxtaposed against legal 
doctrine, economic theory3, the humanitarian approach4, the balanced approach5, 
market mechanics and stakeholder value maximisation. It will be argued that the time 
old link between debt and morality has been severed since the liberalization of 
English bankruptcy laws. The Insolvency Act 1976 (UK) introduced the concept of 
automatic discharge from bankruptcy with a clean slate for the first time. The regime 
in the US with its codified Bankruptcy Code6 also indicates a clear separation of this 
link. These will be considered the birth of this separation, the developed US regime 
will be considered in detail.     
 
This thesis contains the starting premise that a personal administration system 
rather than bankruptcy will achieve value maximisation for stakeholders and that by 
adopting a balanced approach greater economic certainty can be created. 
  
The first section of this thesis will discuss the various approaches to personal 
insolvency law. The three main approaches discussed are those of the economic 
theory, the balanced approach and the humanitarian approach. The balanced approach 
will be further refined to develop a new approach, being that of stakeholder value 
                                                 
3 Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1986). 
4 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: rebalancing the bankruptcy system (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, Connecticut 1997) 
5 John King, “Moving beyond the hard-easy tug of war: a historical, empirical and theoretical 
assessment of bankruptcy discharge” (2004) 28 Melbourne U. L.R. 654 at 676. 
6 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.   
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maximisation. This new approach will be argued as the actual approach used by the 
courts when assessing insolvency cases. 
 
The second section will identify the relevant stakeholders. Their respective 
interests will be explained using economic theory. Creditors will be divided into three 
distinct groups: those who are secured creditors, priority creditors and those who are 
unsecured creditors. The difference in risk assessment tools and ability to factor risk 
into the pricing of creditor goods and services will be analysed.  
 
Debtors will also be examined. The statistical demographics of the average 
insolvent in New Zealand will be discussed along with the changing nature of this 
profile. Debtors fall into two broad categories: consumer debtors and business 
debtors. These categories can be further developed to understand where the debtor sits 
on the debt spectrum, are they a debtor, insolvent or are they bankrupt? The various 
types of debtors and creditors are discussed along with other relevant parties to 
develop a list of individuals who make up the stakeholders to an insolvency. 
 
The third section discusses the current New Zealand insolvency regime and 
the development of the insolvency legislation over time. Particular focus will be given 
to the alternatives to bankruptcy that are contained within the Insolvency Act 2006. 
The alternatives of proposals, compositions and compromises are discussed along 
with the No Asset Procedure and the Summary Instalment Orders. The lack of a 
personal administration system in New Zealand is argued as being a major flaw. 
 
The fourth section looks at the different personal administration regimes that 
are prevalent in other key jurisdictions. The US Chapter 137 personal administration 
model is examined in considerable detail. The focus on the Chapter 13 regime as a 
potential starting point is based on the fact that it is the most mature of all of the 
regimes available for comparative analysis. The limitations of the Chapter 13 model 
are also discussed. The contradictions contained within the scheme are exposed along 
with the conflicting and contradictory nature of many of the key provisions. The 
amendments to Chapter 13 from 2005 called the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act” (BACPA) are also discussed in some detail. It is argued 
that this amendment has detracted some of the usefulness of the underlying 
legislation. 
 
The fifth section focuses on gateways to insolvency regimes. This issue is 
important as many issues are created by the ease or difficulty in accessing insolvency 
and bankruptcy regimes. 
                                                 
7 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1331.   
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The sixth section examines a number of alternatives that either exist currently 
in statute or have been raised by other scholars. These alternatives try to reconcile 
economic theory, legal doctrine, morality, fairness and insolvency law. This is done 
through the use of economic theory, where each transaction or part thereof seeks to 
obtain efficiency. This is where each party “reach[es] an agreement which allocates 
their respective rights and entitlements in a way that is satisfactory to both parties and 
maximises the total output of the transaction.”8 It is argued that increasing the role, 
scope and power of the office of the Official Assignee will add new efficiencies to the 
system by diverting processing matters away from the Court.  
 
In order to instil confidence and transparency within the proposed changes a 
gateway model is proposed. This gateway takes the individual from being a debtor 
through certain procedural processes so that individual is given a different legal 
status. For the purposes of this paper that different legal status has been referred to as 
“personally insolvent”. In this legal state of suspense they are examined by the 
Official Assignee prior to commencing down any of the recommended pathways. 
Using the utilitarian, humanitarian and economic theories together, a variety of 
recommendations for personal insolvency reform are made. These reforms include: 
‘Velvet Bankruptcy’ as mooted by David Hahn9, options for early discharge of 
bankrupt’s with a clean slate, greater use of existing compromise and composition 
provisions contained in the Insolvency Act 2006.  
 
The seventh section will focus on my version of personal administration. This 
system will incorporate a voluntary administration regime pre bankruptcy that is 
administered by the State through the office of the Official Assignee. This has been 
described above as the individual being personally insolvent. Such a scheme would be 
positioned as a precursor to bankruptcy which would be initiated by the Court without 
delay once an act of bankruptcy has been committed. The scheme would incorporate 
the filing of a ‘statement of affairs’ and an examination of the individual by the 
Official Assignee. The results of this examination would then be shared with all 
creditors at a meeting where a set of recommendations about a compromise scheme 
would be put forward by the Official Assignee for creditor input, although the Official 
Assignee would be granted the power to implement the scheme regardless of creditor 
opinion. There would exist mechanisms whereby the Official Assignee would be 
obliged to hear creditor concerns. If creditor objections resulted in the Official 
Assignee deciding not to proceed with the proposal or if the Official Assignee found 
                                                 
8 Anderson, above n.2 at 18. 
9 David Hahn, “Personal Bankruptcy in the 21st Century: Emerging Trends and New Challenges: 
Velvet Bankruptcy” (2006) 7 Theoretical Inq. L. 533. 
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misconduct on the part of the debtor then the Official Assignee would be obliged to 
channel the insolvent into a bankruptcy alternative.  
 
 
II Approaches to Insolvency Law 
 
This section provides a brief examination of some of the leading theoretical 
approaches to insolvency law. King adopts two dominant normative approaches in his 
work on bankruptcy law, termed; ‘the economic approach’ and ‘the balanced 
approach’10. He argues that the balanced approach provides a greater good for debtors, 
creditors and his nebulous ‘community’. This balanced approach is argued as being the 
best approach for evaluation of amendments to the New Zealand insolvency regime. 
This balanced approach is further refined so a new approach is developed. This new 
approach is termed stakeholder value maximisation. It is essentially a subset of the 
balanced approach and will be used as the benchmark for assessing the current 
insolvency regime and also reviewing the proposed reforms. 
 
A Economic Approach 
 
Thomas Jackson, a proponent of the economic approach, suggests “bankruptcy 
law is a response to credit”.11 If there was no credit given then there would be no 
purpose for insolvency legislation. However there is credit; lots of credit, in fact an 
entire industry is based on credit and that industry funds most of the civilised world 
and its production and consumption. The basic principle of credit is that a debtor 
borrows against their future income, potentially using some form of asset as collateral 
for the loan.  
 
This system works incredibly well as long as the debtor is able to continue to 
make payments. When a debtor is unable to make payments insolvency occurs. 
Jackson argues that bankruptcy law is primarily focused on a compulsory collective 
system for satisfying the claims of creditors. Bankruptcy becomes a cooperative 
device to allow creditors, who may be a diverse group, to work collectively to share in 
the insolvent’s estate. The alternative would be each creditor operating independently 
to pursue their own remedy.12 
 
The economic theory is based on the presumption that the lenders have a better 
understanding of the potential risks of credit than debtors. Creditors are therefore 
                                                 
10 King, above n 5, at 677. 
11 Jackson, above n 3 at 7. 
12 At 14. 
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better placed to carry the risk/burden of insolvency of a debtor. If a bankruptcy 
occurs, it is ultimately the creditor who suffers the loss if the bankrupt estate falls 
short. Economic theory claims that the cost of this potential loss is factored into the 
cost of the credit.13 
 
Discharge from bankruptcy does give the bankrupt a fresh start and 
extinguishes the creditor’s collection remedies. This discharge according to the 
economic theory, is acceptable because it is priced into the cost of credit and the 
bankrupt has contributed all of their non-exempt assets to the bankrupt estate. By both 
parties sharing some of the risks an equilibrium occurs. Creditors maintain 
responsibility for monitoring their lending and debtors balance their consumption with 
their income. Economic theory argues that if discharge becomes too easy then the cost 
of credit has to increase and its availability has to become more selective. Conversely 
if the discharge provisions become too onerous, people would become more cautious 
and would not avail themselves of credit, thereby upsetting the equilibrium of the 
credit economy. 
 
 
It is argued that the economic approach is too narrow in its assessment of 
insolvency situations. The fundamental problem with the economic approach as stated 
by Donald Korobkin is:14 
 
[I]n narrowly seeking to explain bankruptcy law as a mechanism for 
achieving economic outcomes, the economic account has prevented itself 
from locating what truly makes bankruptcy law distinct. Most 
importantly, because of its focus on corporate insolvency, the economic 
approach does not address the discharge provisions and the 
accompanying fresh start provisions 
 
This focus on the economic problem of bankruptcy is a one dimensional view of 
a set of much larger issues. Whilst debt collection and distribution of the bankrupt’s 
estate to creditors are an important aspect of insolvency law and function they represent 
only one part of the function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Thomas Jackson, “The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law” (1984-1985) 98 Harvard L.R. 1393 at 
1399. 
14 Donald Korobkin, “Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy” (1990) 91 Columbia Law 
Review at 739. 
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B Balanced Approach 
 
The alternative approach as put forward by King is the balanced approach, 
which “must equitably balance the interests of creditors, debtors and the community.”15 
This view represents a paradigm shift from the economic approach to encompass the 
full gambit of issues. Many commentators argue that this approach is the dominant 
approach of modern bankruptcy law. Steven Harris argues “that bankruptcy law in large 
measure seeks to accommodate a number of societal values at the time when the debtor 
is in financial difficulty.”16 Karen Gross has developed a conceptual theory that 
bankruptcy is a “three legged stool.”17 This concept is expanded by King as follows:18 
 
Each leg [of the three legged stool] represents a group of interests – those 
of debtors, creditors and the community. The support of all three legs is 
crucial, and all are interconnected. Similarly, an ideal bankruptcy system 
will equitably balance all three interests: the debtor would have a fresh 
start, creditors would be paid in an economically efficient manner, and 
community interests would be preserved. 
 
This concept of equitable balance is a theoretical ideal that any proposed reform 
should aspire to. The reality is that like many theoretical ideals it could prove elusive to 
achieve. 
 
Economic theory can still support this balanced approach and economic 
efficiency can still be achieved. The generally accepted measure of economic efficiency 
is Kaldor-Hicks analysis.19 This analysis involves resource allocation in a manner 
whereby the “benefit to those who are better off exceeds the harm to those that are 
worse off.”20 
 
 
Taking this balanced approach and extending into the wider philosophical 
framework of a utilitarian philosophy an ideal fit is created. “If the benefit to society 
outweighs the detriment to the individual, the overall result is seen as fair.”21 
                                                 
15 King, above n 5 at 676. 
16 Steven Harris, “A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg’s Bankruptcy Law in Perspective” (1982) 30 UCLA 
L.R. 364. 
17 Gross, above n 4. 
18 King, above n 5 at 677. 
19 This is named for Nicholas Kaldor, “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility” (1939) 49 Economic Journal 549, and John Hicks, “The Foundations of 
Welfare Economics” (1939) 49 Economic Journal 696. 
20 Ian Ward, An Introduction to Critical Legal Theory (1st ed, 1998) 129. 
21 Daniel Farber, “What (if Anything) Can Economics Say about Equity?” (2003) 101 Mich. L. Rev. 
1791.  
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“Conversely, it is unfair to recognise the rights of one person if that harms the 
wellbeing of the rest of society.”22  
 
Since the basis of insolvency law accepts that there is going to be a loss for at 
least some parties, a utilitarian approach which focuses on the greatest good or the least 
harm is the most practical framework when a balanced approach is taken. However this 
approach still has one major short coming in that it is nigh impossible to measure harm 
or benefit. M D A Freeman notes:23 
 
One of the problems with utilitarianism is the lack of a method for 
calculating the effect of a decision or policy on the total happiness of a 
relevant [population]. It [also] offers no reliable technique for measuring 
change in the level of satisfaction of one individual relative to a change 
in the level of satisfaction of another. 
 
Philosophers and economists have long since vigorously defended this 
shortcoming by usurping the decision back to the sovereign. In the case of an 
insolvency in New Zealand the Official Assignee would be best positioned to decide on 
what is ‘fair’ based on the individual facts of each insolvency. Parliament would 
provide the legislative framework so the Official Assignee had guidance on what 
Parliament considered the correct way to interpret ‘fairness’. Jason Neyers makes the 
following comment on fairness in a wealth redistribution scenario:24 
 
Of relevance to our discussion is the fact that fairness is often used to 
refer to how wealth is distributed in society. So unlike efficiency, 
fairness in concerned with the end effect of wealth distribution… Also, 
fairness in our legal tradition assumes support for those who are 
vulnerable and the meeting of people’s reasonable and legitimate 
expectations.  
 
The concept of fairness within a utilitarian system can further be expanded to 
include the views of the various stakeholders to the insolvency. Anderson states:25 
 
In terms of economic teleology, an outcome is both Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient as well as fair and just if it brings about a net benefit to society, 
even though some people may be much worse off. The rights of the 
individual are set aside in pursuit of a ‘greater good’, so that a result that 
is Kaldor-Hicks efficient in economic terms is fair in legal terms. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Anderson, above n 2 at 18. 
23 M D A Freeman Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (7th ed, 2001) 557. 
24 Jason Neyers, “Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing and the Private Law Model Corporation” 
(2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal at 213. 
25 Anderson, above n 2 at 18. 
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C The Humanitarian Approach 
 
Karen Gross, a leading proponent of the humanitarian approach, looks further 
than the simple debtor creditor relationship and takes a holistic view of society as a 
whole.26 If the only players were the debtor and the creditor Gross argues that the 
creditor would go to extreme lengths to pursue the debtor. Even after the debtor had 
sold all of their assets and there was an on-going shortfall the creditor would still keep 
pursuing the debtor. This in theory could create a situation of permanent indebtedness 
which the debtor could never escape from. This would cause the debtor to give up 
hope and they could cease to be a productive member of society. 
 
It is also recognised that under the humanitarian approach there are other 
factors to be considered. Penney notes that there are other factors at play:27 
 
The inability to repay money borrowed represents larger issues and failures, not just of the 
debtor, but of society as a whole. These failures include those in industries, education and 
health systems, families as well as the lending system. The fact that one cannot meet their 
debts may be the result of something that is beyond their control. A failure in any aspect of a 
person’s life may result in an inability to meet ones financial obligations. 
 
Gross takes issue with many of the current bankruptcy regimes for not 
providing a variety of different treatments of bankrupts based on their personal 
circumstances and their culpability in their financial distress. The humanitarian 
approach is based around rehabilitation of the bankrupt. There is a broad assumption 
that there must have been a failure of some sort for the bankruptcy to occur. This 
failure may or may not be within the control of the bankrupt, for example ill health. 
The discharge with a fresh start is just part of the rehabilitation process according to 
Gross.28  
 
Both the economic and the humanitarian theories arrive at the same general 
conclusion that discharge from bankruptcy is a good thing for creditors, debtor and 
society as a whole.29 While both theories reach this conclusion through differing 
processes of analysis they share some common themes. A credit economy can only 
operate efficiently in conjunction with a robust insolvency regime: a debtor is more 
valuable to society if they are able to make a positive contribution and will only be 
motivated to do so should a discharge occur. As a result of this positive contribution, 
society as a whole benefits from the discharge. The bankrupt has paid the price for the 
fresh start through the bankruptcy. 
 
                                                 
26 Gross, above n 2 at 14 – 24. 
27 Jane Penney, Discharge of Bankrupts: Recent Developments (Law Faculty Victoria University, 
Wellington, 2008) at 20. 
28 Gross, above n 4 at 131. 
29 Penney, above n 27 at 24. 
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D Conclusion 
 
Although stakeholders” respective interests undoubtedly compete, there may 
exist a compromise solution that is fair and acceptable to all. Such a solution may in 
fact be a mechanism for extracting maximum value for all stakeholders to the 
insolvency. This refinement of the balanced approach provides the concept of 
stakeholder value maximisation. Although not a traditional concept in its own right, 
the Court has shown that it has tried to perform such a balancing of stakeholder 
interests in New Zealand insolvency cases. Most of these cases are in respect of 
discharge objections where the interests of the following parties/interest groups are 
weighed up by the Court: the insolvent’s interests, the creditor’s interests, the public 
interest, commercial morality and the conduct of the insolvent.30 It is through 
adopting this balancing of various competing stakeholder interests that value 
maximisation occurs. 
 
III Identification of the Stakeholders in Personal Insolvencies 
 
This chapter sets out to identify the relevant stakeholders whose interests 
should be balanced. Traditional literature on personal insolvency is focused on the 
relationship between debtor and creditor and on the moral views of the public in 
general. As Douglas Boshkoff: states:31 
 
Any bankruptcy law must, of necessity, be an accommodation between 
competing interests that include the creditor’s desire to be paid, the 
debtor’s desire to escape a burdensome situation, the value society places 
on having people pay their debts in full, and the value society places on 
allowing debtors to start anew when overtaken by financial misfortune. 
 
John King discusses the “interests of creditors, debtors and the community”32 
but fails to provide any identification of ‘the community’. This lack of concise 
identification of all relevant stakeholders limits a full examination of insolvency law 
and its impact to society in general. This section sets out to expand on King’s approach 
by identifying relevant stakeholders to insolvencies. These stakeholders will be the 
cornerstones of the proposed reforms outlined in the latter stages of this thesis. The 
motivation of each stakeholder is also discussed in order to provide a deeper level of 
understanding of their respective stake in the insolvency.  
                                                 
30 Brookers Online, “Commentary Insolvency Law & Practice” Brookers Online 
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/databases/modus/lawpart/statutes/ACT-NZL-PUB-
Y.2006-55~BDY~PT.4~SPT.1~SG.!101~S.298?si=57359 last viewed 26 February 2014. 
31 Douglass Boshkoff, “Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American 
Bankruptcy Proceedings’” (1998) 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69 at 125. 
32 King, above n 5 at 676. 
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A The Debtor 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the concept of the debtor is broken down into 
three general categories: a debtor refers to an individual who owes a debt to a creditor, 
an insolvent refers to any debtor who has failed to pay their debt to a creditor as it 
falls due or has committed an ‘Act of Bankruptcy’ as defined by the Insolvency Act 
200633, a bankrupt refers to an individual who has been bankrupted by either debtor or 
creditor petition. 
 
Each category of debtor can be further divided based on their conduct. King 
notes from an Australian perspective:34 
 
Currently, a distinction is made between a bankrupt who has 
committed fraudulent conduct (‘fraudulent bankrupt’) and other 
bankrupts (‘unfortunate bankrupt’). There are numerous practical 
problems in even this seemingly simple distinction. 
Nevertheless, Australian bankruptcy law distinguishes between 
these two types of bankrupts in administrative and discharge 
processes. An unfortunate bankrupt can expect a brief and non-
intrusive administration and a standard discharge… By contrast, 
a fraudulent bankrupt can expect a rigorous administration 
designed to expose any commercially culpable conduct and is 
likely to have discharge delayed. 
 
King also notes in his work a third type of bankrupt being the reckless 
bankrupt. The reckless bankrupt can be its own category or a sub-category of the 
fraudulent bankrupt depending on the prevailing fact scenario. 
 
 
1 Changing debtor profile 
 
There are essentially two broad categories of debtor; the business debtor/failed 
entrepreneur, and the consumer debtor. One of the driving forces behind the 
Insolvency Act 2006 was a recognition that the profile of the average bankrupt had 
changed since the Insolvency Act 1967. Fleur Baker and Ralph Simpson observed:35 
 
The changing make-up of a “typical bankrupt” means that the regime is 
no longer providing an effective solution for the majority of debtors and 
creditors. This is largely related to the increase in people who become 
bankrupt due to consumer credit related issues, as opposed to the high 
                                                 
33 Insolvency Act 2006, ss16-28.  
34 King, above n 5 at 663. 
35 Fleur Baker and Ralph Simpson, Creditors’ Remedies (Continuing Legal Education Department of 
the New Zealand Law Society, 2001). 
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number of sole-trader bankrupts when the law was last reviewed in the 
1960s. 
 
 
 (a) Consumer debtors 
 
The modern debtor is a consumer debtor. A consumer has been defined by the 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 as follows:36 
 
consumer means a person who— 
(a) acquires from a supplier goods or services of a kind ordinarily 
acquired for personal, domestic, or household use or consumption; 
and 
(b) does not acquire the goods or services, or hold himself or 
herself out as acquiring the goods or services, for the purpose of— 
(i) resupplying them in trade; or 
(ii) consuming them in the course of a process of 
production or manufacture; or 
(iii) in the case of goods, repairing or treating in trade other 
goods or fixtures on land 
 
It is reasonable for the purpose of this paper to adopt this definition for a 
consumer. Although there are other definitions of a consumer in other New Zealand 
legislation, this definition allows for clear differentiation from a business debtor. Any 
consumer debtor or consumer bankrupt must be an individual who has acquired their 
respective debts or obligations for the purpose of supporting their consumption. 
 
The statistical profile of the modern bankrupt will typically be: a New Zealand 
European (54%37), male (61%)38, aged between 40 and 44 (17%)39 and unemployed40. 
 
The other debtor type is the business debtor/failed entrepreneur which shall 
now be discussed. 
 
(b) The failed entrepreneur or business debtor 
 
A failed entrepreneur is simply a debtor who incurred their obligations 
through a business or a commercial debt being unable to be repaid. Incorporation has 
allowed entrepreneurs a risk taking vehicle to carry out commercial operations. By 
using such a vehicle the concepts of limited liability would in theory protect the 
entrepreneur from personal liability from an honest business failure. The doctrine of 
                                                 
36 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, s2(1). 
37 Insolvency and Trustee Service Insolvency Statistics and Debtor Profile Report for the Year 1 July 
2012 to 30 June 2013, (Insolvency and Trustee Service, New Zealand, 2013) at 11. 
38 At 11. 
39 At 11. 
40 At 11. 
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limited liability that was concisely articulated in Salomon41 has been recognised as 
one of the foundations of corporate law. The uptake of the use of incorporation has 
grown considerably over the last century. 
 
“Limited liability comes with a cost. It harbours the hazard of entrepreneurs 
engaging in overly risky business activities. This is called overinvestment.”42 The 
blanket protection offered to an entrepreneur who incorporates, shifts the entire risk of 
the venture to the creditors. Yet the majority of the benefit if the venture succeeds 
flows to the entrepreneur. This is clearly an imbalance that encourages entrepreneurs 
to the detriment of creditors. 
 
The growth in the use of limited liability incorporations has also lead to a 
situation where entrepreneurs who want to avail themselves of credit for a project 
have to provide a personal guarantee. David Hahn notes:43 
 
A personal guarantee undertaken by a shareholder exposes that 
shareholder to the guaranteed corporate lender. Against this 
creditor, the guarantee effectively reverses the principle of 
limited liability. The corporate and personal bankruptcy laws 
determine the extent of debt that the corporation and its 
guarantor-shareholder will ultimately have to pay the creditor 
upon the insolvency of the corporation. 
  
This circumvention of the doctrine of limited liability exposes the potential 
entrepreneur to considerable additional personal risk. Therefore “the theoretical 
premise of limited liability as an entrepreneur-friendly feature of incorporation is 
simply outdated.”44 
 
   
B Creditors 
 
In order to be a creditor to an insolvency, a creditor has to have a debt that is 
provable. The Insolvency Act 2006 describes a provable debt as:45 
 
 
232 What debts are provable debts 
(1) A provable debt is a debt or liability that the 
bankrupt owes— 
(a) at the time of adjudication; or 
                                                 
41 Salomon v Salomon & Co [1897] AC 22. 
42 Hahn, above n 9 at 528. 
43 At 524. 
44 Charles Tabb, “The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the 
Dischargability Debate” (1990) 59 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 56 at 100.  
45 Insolvency Act 2006, s 232. 
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(b) after adjudication but before 
discharge, by reason of an obligation 
incurred by the bankrupt before 
adjudication. 
(2) A fine, penalty, sentence of reparation, 
or other order for the payment of money 
that has been made following any 
conviction or order made under section 106 
of the Sentencing Act 2002— 
(a) is not a provable debt; and 
(b) is not discharged when the bankrupt 
is discharged from bankruptcy. 
 
 
Creditors, like debtors can also be divided into several subgroups of 
stakeholder. The first division of creditors should be between those that hold a 
security and those that do not. 
 
1 Secured creditors 
 
Banks and other professional lenders, including trade creditors understand the 
risks of default from a borrower. Banks have invested heavily in systems and 
processes so as to assess an individual’s credit worthiness prior to providing any 
credit. Lenders also have the ability to price their credit based on the perceived risk of 
a given venture. Banks are also able to spread their potential losses or mitigate them 
entirely through insurance and personal guarantees. Further, through their size and 
diversified “customer [base], banks are the most efficient risk-bearers of the [debtors] 
defaults.”46 
 
These professional lenders often are also secured, meaning that their debt is 
attached in some form to the debtor’s property. This can either be achieved through a 
registered mortgage, caveat or a registered security on the securities register. By 
holding a security a creditor has additional options over unsecured creditors for debt 
collection. The Insolvency Act 2006 provides:47 
 
 
 
243 Secured creditor's options in relation to 
property subject to charge 
(1) A secured creditor may— 
                                                 
46 Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University 
Press, 1991).  
47 Insolvency Act 2006, s 243. 
20 
 
(a) realise property subject to a charge, 
if entitled to do so (Option 1); or 
(b) value the property subject to the 
charge and prove in the bankruptcy as 
an unsecured creditor for the balance 
due (if any) after deducting the amount 
of the valuation (Option 2); or 
(c) surrender the charge to the Assignee 
for the general benefit of the creditors 
and prove in the bankruptcy as an 
unsecured creditor for the whole debt 
(Option 3). 
(2) Despite subsection (1), a secured 
creditor may exercise Option 1 whether or 
not the creditor has exercised Option 2. 
 
 
 
2 Priority creditors  
 
A creditor holds a priority or a preferential claim to be paid by virtue of the 
Insolvency Act 200648. Some priorities of note are: the Official Assignee for carrying 
out the administration of the bankruptcy49, the petitioning creditor for their costs (if 
there was a petitioning creditor)50, and the Commissioner for Inland Revenue51. A 
priority creditor holds a priority over unsecured creditors without priority. Being a 
priority creditor does not provide any certainty of recovery of the debt. If there is 
some recovery of the debt it is managed by the Insolvency Act 200652. 
 
3 Unsecured creditors 
  
An unsecured creditor is a creditor that holds no security and has no priority 
under the Insolvency Act 200653. Unsecured creditors are only entitled to a dividend if 
there are funds left after payment of secured and priority creditors.   
 
4 Student loans 
 
Since the inception of the Student Loans Scheme54 in New Zealand, the 
Ministry of Social Development has become a substantial creditor.  Jane Penney 
observes:55 
                                                 
48 Insolvency Act 2006, s 274. 
49 Section s 274(1)(a). 
50 Section s 274(1)(b). 
51 Section 274. 
52 Sections 274 – 279. 
53 Section 280. 
54 Student Loan Scheme Act 1992. 
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New Zealand is one of the only jurisdictions in which student 
loans are provable in bankruptcy. In the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Canada student loans are not provable debts. 
Two reasons are given to support this. The first is that students 
would abuse the bankruptcy system in order to free themselves 
of these debts before embarking on lucrative careers. The second 
reason is the need to protect the public interest. In all 
jurisdictions except the United States student loans are 
government loans. 
 
 
Parliament has also legislated a level of priority to student loans56. Penney notes:57  
 
The Queen acting through the Minister of Social Security is the 
lender and at the end of each loan year the balance is transferred 
to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for collection. Thus 
student loans are crown debts. This results in student loans being 
paid above other unsecured debts. 
 
Student Loans are a provable debt in bankruptcy. They like all other provable 
debts are dealt with by the Insolvency Act 2006. Student Loans because of their 
unique nature do warrant specific mention.   
 
 
 
C The Official Assignee 
 
The office of the Official Assignee has no connection with the debtor or the 
insolvent. However the moment an adjudication of bankruptcy occurs either by debtor 
or creditor petition the Official Assignee becomes involved. The Official Assignee’s 
role is to administer the bankruptcy regime in New Zealand. The powers of the 
Official Assignee are contained in the first Schedule of the Insolvency Act 2006.58 
These powers are wide ranging and allow the assignee to deal with the bankrupt’s 
estate. Section 64 of the Insolvency Act outlines the process on adjudication:59 
 
64 Outline of what happens on adjudication 
(1) On adjudication— 
(a) the Assignee must advertise the adjudication; and 
(b) the bankrupt must file with the Assignee a statement of his or her 
affairs, if the bankrupt has not already done so; and 
(c) the Assignee may call a meeting of the bankrupt's creditors; and 
(d) proceedings to recover certain debts must be halted; and 
                                                                                                                                            
55 Penney, above n 27 at 25. 
56 Student Loan Scheme Act 1992, s 4. 
57 Penney, above n 27 at 27. 
58 Insolvency Act 2006. Schedule 1.  
59 Section 64. 
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(e) the property of the bankrupt vests in the Assignee. 
(2) This section is a guide only to the immediate consequences of adjudication. 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of involvement of the Official Assignee prior to 
adjudication it is clear that its role is pivotal in the administration of the bankruptcy 
regime, and therefore must be classified as a stakeholder. Further the Official 
Assignee incurs expenses on behalf of the bankrupt estate for its administration, these 
fees are also ranked as a preferential debt in compositions. If a composition is reached 
during bankruptcy the Official Assignees’ fees must be paid prior to court approval.60 
The reforms proposed in later chapters increase the involvement of the Official 
Assignee in the management of insolvencies in New Zealand.   
 
 
 
D Additional Factors for Consideration 
 
As discussed already there is an identified need for entrepreneurship within 
the economy. The generation of extra tax receipts, employment and export dollars are 
all benefits to the economy and the business community. The business community 
must have a level of certainty about the interactions of different parties for its 
effective operation. Rules must exist and be obeyed, otherwise a level of economic 
anarchy would descend. 
 
1 The business community 
 
This group has peripheral interest in individual insolvencies. Whenever 
possible the risk is factored into the price of goods and services. The business 
communities’ interest is in the upholding of commercial law, legal doctrine and the 
concept of certainty within the context of business dealings. It is acknowledged by 
Stephen Bainbridge that the theoretical “’Economic Man’; the ‘autonomous 
individual who makes rational choices that maximise his satisfactions’ would be ‘a 
feral monster with no partners and no customers.’”61 This is clearly not the reality of 
the commercial world. Instead there must exist an underlying level of trust between 
all economic players for a capitalist system to function. Part of that trust exists 
through having fair, reliable and transparent insolvency procedures. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Section 317(3). 
61 Stephen Bainbridge, “Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law Scholarship” (1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856 at 871. 
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2 The moral public 
 
As stated previously there exists a strong swell of public opinion that debtors 
do not just abandon their debts and that bankruptcy has an element of moral failing 
attached to it. Challenging these social stereotypes is not easy; Joseph Spooner62 
argues that bankruptcy regimes suffer from political apathy or worse, political 
avoidance, with no politician wanting to be seen as championing the cause of 
bankrupts.  
 
The moral public rationalises its position with the logic ‘if I have to pay my 
debts then why shouldn’t everybody else?’ There is of course no easy answer to this 
question and philosophical and academic debate still surrounds this exact question. 
Equally the moral public wants to protections for the vulnerable from unscrupulous 
creditors and lenders, hence the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003. 
  
 
E Identification of Stakeholders 
 
After analysis of the ‘debtor, creditor and community’ summary provided by 
King63, it is quite clear that the stakeholders in a bankruptcy are numerous. Each 
stakeholder sits with a unique perspective on the insolvency with its own individual 
vested interests in the outcome of the process. Therefore any meaningful discussion 
on bankruptcy or possible alternatives to it must address the interests of the 
stakeholders. The identified types of stakeholders to New Zealand insolvencies are: 
debtors, insolvents, bankrupts, secured creditors, priority creditors, unsecured 
creditors, the office of the Official Assignee and the general public.   
 
 
IV New Zealand’s Current Insolvency Regime 
 
This chapter examines the current and historical legislation relating to 
insolvency law. The purpose of this examination is to identify potential gaps in the 
current alternative. By looking at the historical developments in insolvency, 
normative features of the regime can be identified. Further by observing the statistical 
trends in the type and demographics of insolvents it is possible to suggest 
amendments that are highly relevant to the changing face of the New Zealand 
insolvent. 
                                                 
62 Spooner, above n 1. 
 
63 King, above n 5. 
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A History 
 
Most law in New Zealand has its root in English law and insolvency law is no 
exception. Therefore to understand the history of insolvency law in New Zealand, a 
brief examination of English Law is required. The purpose of the examination of the 
historical developments of insolvency law in New Zealand is to demonstrate a 
historical precedent for compositions or other arrangements where creditors receive 
less than the full amount that they are owed.  
 
“From the mid sixteenth century, until the early seventeenth century, the Privy 
Council, in its executive role, actively worked to assist debtors in financial 
difficulties”64 with compositions. Heath and Whale noted that the Privy Council:65  
 
arrang[ed] arbitrations with creditors, but also extended to intimidating 
creditors into accepting compromises and, on occasion, imprisoning 
dissenting creditors. Over much the same period the Court of Chancery 
exercised a jurisdiction to enforce compromises.  
 
In 1697 the concept of compositions made their first appearance in legislation 
with the 1697 Act66. This legislation allowed debtors to bind creditors if a majority of 
two thirds was reached. This legislation was repealed about a year later because of the 
prevalence of fraud on the part of debtors in stacking the creditor numbers in their 
favour. 
 
Over the next century there was no legislative recognition of compositions. 
The Bankruptcy Consolidation Act of 182567 restored compositions as a legislated 
alternative to bankruptcy. Compositions have remained in all insolvency legislation 
since this time in English law, and were directly imported to New Zealand law with 
the Bankruptcy Act 188368. 
 
The Bankruptcy Consolidation Act of 182569 provided a very high threshold 
requirement based on the number of creditors and percentage of debt. Support in 
excess of 90% in number of creditors and value of debt was required in order to bind 
creditors. In examining the rationale for this Treiman noted “it was aimed not at 
                                                 
64 Israel Treiman, “Majority Control in Compositions: Its Historical Origins and Development” (1937) 
Va. L. Rev. 507. 
65 Paul Heath and Michael Whale, Insolvency Law in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at 
240. 
66 1697 Act, 8, 9 Will III, cl 8. 
67 Bankruptcy Consolidation Act 1825 (UK). 
68 Bankruptcy Act 1883. 
69 Bankruptcy Consolidation Act 1825 (UK) 6 Geo IV, cl 6. 
25 
 
giving effect to the wishes of the majority of creditors, but rather preventing a small 
minority from blocking the composition.”70 
 
Under all of the New Zealand Insolvency Acts71 since 1883 compositions have 
only been allowed once bankruptcy had been adjudicated (meaning they were not 
alternatives to bankruptcy but rather a mechanism for achieving early discharge or 
annulment). The Insolvency Act of 196772 with the addition of Part XV added a pre-
bankruptcy composition alternative for the first time. The wording of Part XV appears 
to be a duplication of the wording used for post-bankruptcy compositions. These pre 
bankruptcy compositions are referred to as ‘proposals’ in New Zealand legislation. 
 
The long history of both pre and post-bankruptcy compositions demonstrates a 
normative approach towards compositions within a cultural context. It would also be a 
reasonable proposition that compositions were deemed to be an acceptable alternative 
to bankruptcy from the perspective of all stakeholders. Accordingly there appears to 
have never been any lobbying to remove compositions as a legislated option. In fact 
the opposite appears to be the case in that more alternatives to bankruptcy are being 
added in each of the last two Insolvency Acts.73  
 
Company legislation in New Zealand also contains direct reference to 
compromises in Part 14 of the Act74 and voluntary administration in Part 15A75, both 
of which are potential alternative forms of debtor relief. These additional pieces of 
legislation also support the proposition that stakeholders accept that in some 
circumstances alternatives to insolvency need to exist. 
 
The historical acceptance of compositions as being a mode for Court 
sanctioned debt relief is well established. Further the evolution of New Zealand law 
has demonstrated a preference for compositions to be reviewed by the Court at a time 
when the debtor is bankrupt. This achieves the result that all compositions presented 
to the Court are presented by individuals who are already under the control of the 
Official Assignee. The Court then has the benefit of the full report of the Official 
Assignee76 prior to any decision being made. 
 
 
                                                 
70 Treiman, above n 60 at 523-524. 
71 New Zealand has had new insolvency legislation in the Acts of 1892, 1908, 1967 and 2006. 
72 Insolvency Act 1967. 
73 Insolvency Act 1967 added Part XV Proposals and the Insolvency Act 2006 added, ‘No Asset 
Procedure” and “Summary Instalment Orders”. 
74 Companies Act 1993, s227. 
75 Companies Act 1993, s 239A. 
76 Insolvency Act 2006, s 296. 
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B The Unique Current New Zealand Law 
 
Personal insolvency law in New Zealand is antiquated compared to many 
other first world countries. New Zealand is one of the few jurisdictions to operate a 
dual system of insolvency regimes in that it has a system for personal insolvency 
separate from that of corporate insolvencies77. The Law Commission recommended in 
its 2001 report that the “collection of all insolvency law under one umbrella statute 
has appeal: such a statute is likely to promote both accessibility to and comprehension 
of, the law”78 This recommendation was not followed. The logic for not following this 
was that “a single statute would be large and complex, with superficial semblance of 
order.”79 Thus New Zealand continues to operate a dual system notwithstanding the 
Law Commission recommendations. 
 
C Current Options in New Zealand 
 
In order to understand the current alternatives to bankruptcy in New Zealand 
an understanding of bankruptcy itself should first be established. Section 7 of the 
Insolvency Act provides the following commentary:80 
 
 7 Nature of Bankruptcy 
(1) Bankruptcy affects the legal status of a person and has important 
consequences. These include- 
(a) The bankrupt’s property vests in the Official Assignee: 
(b) The bankrupt is limited in the business activities he or she can 
undertake: 
(c) The Official Assignee may be entitled to recover assets that 
the bankrupt has transferred before bankruptcy. 
(2) This section is intended only as a guide to the consequences of 
bankruptcy. 
 
As s7(2) notes this is a guide only to the consequences and a full reading of 
the Act and Regulations should be performed in order to gain a fuller understanding. 
 
When the current changes were first mooted in the Insolvency Reform Bill 
which was introduced on 21 December 2005, the Bill contained an Explanatory Note 
that the objectives of the new statutes were to:81 
 
(i) Provide a predictable and simple regime for financial failure that can be administered 
quickly and efficiently, imposes the minimum necessary compliance and regulatory 
                                                 
77 Section 6. Also see Companies Act 1993. 
78 New Zealand Law Commission, “Insolvency Law Reform: Promoting Trust and Confidence” An 
Advisory Report to the Ministry of Economic Development, Study Paper 11, Wellington, (2001), p112. 
79 Ministry of Economic Development Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill Discussion Document 
Wellington, (2004), p51. 
80 Insolvency Act, s 7. 
81 Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2005 (No 14-1) (Explanatory Note, General Policy Statement) at 1. 
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costs on its users and does not stifle innovation, responsible risk taking, and 
entrepreneurialism by excessively penalising business failure; 
(ii) Distribute the proceeds to creditors in accordance with their relative pre insolvency 
entitlements, unless it can be shown that the public interest in providing greater 
protection to one or more creditors outweighs the economic and social costs of any 
such priority; 
(iii) Maximise the return to creditors by providing flexible and effective methods of 
insolvency administration and enforcement which encourage early intervention when 
financial distress becomes apparent; 
(iv) Enable individuals in bankruptcy to participate again fully in the economic life of the 
community; and 
(v) Promote international co-operation in relation to cross boarder insolvency. 
 
 
It is argued that this demonstrates Parliament’s intention to maximise value for 
all stakeholders. The current insolvency legislation in New Zealand offers a range of 
alternatives to bankruptcy that are all contained in the legislation. A discussion of 
these alternatives now follows. 
 
 
D Current Alternatives to Bankruptcy 
 
The Insolvency Act 2006 bought in two new alternatives to bankruptcy: the no 
asset procedure82 and the summary instalment order.83The uptake of these two 
alternatives now accounts for approximately a third of all insolvency cases in New 
Zealand84.  
 
1 Summary instalment orders  
 
The summary instalment order relates to unsecured debts of up to $40,000 and 
is accessed by a simple process that does not involve the Court. Entry into the scheme 
is by direct application to the Official Assignee. To be eligible for the summary 
instalment order a debtor must be in the required debt limits and be unable to 
immediately pay those debts.85 The procedure can be initiated by either a debtor or a 
creditor, with the debtor’s consent.86 The application must be in the prescribed form 
and be accompanied by payment of the fee of $10087. It is an interesting aside that this 
fee is the only fee that is charged under the Insolvency Act 2006 for applications of 
insolvency relief. There appears to be no substantial commentary on the rational for a 
fee being payable for only summary instalment orders. 
                                                 
82 Sections 361 – 377B. 
83 Sections 340 – 360. 
84 Insolvency and Trustee Service, above n 37 at 2.  
85 Insolvency Act 2006, s 343(1). 
86 Section 341. 
87 Section 342(2). 
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Although the application is filed with the Official Assignee, the debtor may 
nominate a supervisor who will oversee the program88. If the debtor does not provide 
the details of a suitable individual to act as the supervisor, the Official Assignee can 
perform the role.89 As soon as practicable after filing with the Official Assignee all 
creditors must be notified of the order. Creditors then have 10 days to make 
submissions to the Official Assignee about the proposed order.90 The nature of the 
application does not have to allow for full payment of all debts, covered by the 
proposed order but it must clearly state the proposed dividend.91  
 
On an order being made by the Official Assignee, the supervisor must send a 
notice to all creditors.92 The order may contain direction that the debtor’s wages are to 
be garnished by their employer and paid directly to the supervisor.93 The supervisor’s 
role and function are set out in the Act and the Regulations.94 
 
Creditors are estopped from taking further legal or enforcement actions. The 
District Court is required to cease any proceeding, upon receiving notice of an order.95 
If a debtor defaults in making any of the payments due under the order, ceased 
proceedings can be continued.96 This provides a considerable incentive for debtor 
compliance with the order. 
 
2 No Asset Procedure 
 
The no asset procedure has been developed as an efficient mechanism for 
dealing with debtors who have no assets. The no asset procedure is akin to a mini 
bankruptcy that only lasts a maximum of 12 months prior to discharge97. The aim of 
the no asset procedure was to, according to Brown, “provide first time bankrupts with 
a fresh start without the stigma attached to bankruptcy.98 
 
To be eligible for the no asset procedure a debtor has to have between $1,000 
and $40,000 of debt, no assets (except those allowed by the legislation) and no means 
                                                 
88 Section 342(2)(c) 
89 Section 342. 
90 Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations 2007, reg 44(5). 
91 Section 342(2)(a) 
92 Section 342. 
93 Section 344. 
94 Section 346 and Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations, regs 59 – 64. 
95 Section 352(3). 
96 Section 359. 
97 Section 377(1). 
98 David Brown and Thomas GW Telfer, Personal and Corporate Insolvency Legislation: Guide and 
Commentary to the 2006 Amendments (Lexis Nexis NZ Ltd, Wellington, 2007) at 28. 
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to repay their debts along with never being bankrupt previously.99 To enter the 
scheme the debtor has to complete a statement of affairs in the prescribed form.100 
The debtor is deemed to have been accepted into the procedure when the Official 
Assignee sends the debtor a written notice.101 On being accepted into the procedure all 
creditors are estopped from proceeding or commencing enforcement procedures.102 A 
key differentiating factor between this procedure and bankruptcy is that student loans 
are not covered by this procedure.103 
 
The procedure can come to a conclusion through a variety of different ways: 
discharge from the procedure at the expiration of the 12 months104, the Official 
Assignee terminates the debtor’s involvement in the procedure because of some 
dishonesty on the part of the debtor105, or because the debtor has been adjudicated 
bankrupt by either debtor or creditor petition. If the debtor has been discharged the 
debts that were enforceable on entry to the procedure are cancelled and the debtor is 
discharged of all obligations for any outstanding balance, interest or penalties 
associated with the debts.106 
 
3 Compositions and proposals 
 
Compositions can only occur post-bankruptcy under the Insolvency Act 
2006107. They are Court sanctioned alternatives for bankrupts to deal with their 
bankrupt estate. Proposals are Court sanctioned pre-bankruptcy alternatives. Both 
proposals and compositions must be presented to the Court in a very specific format. 
There is merit in examining the current wording of what the Court requires prior to 
approving compositions under section 315 and comparing it with the Court’s 
requirements under section 333 for approving proposals made pre-bankruptcy. 
 
Section 333 expressly acknowledges that a third party trustee will be directly 
involved in administering the proposal. In contrast section 315 is silent on the subject. 
It must therefore be assumed that the only party who can act as trustee in those 
circumstances is the Official Assignee. This would make sense as the applicant under 
section 315 is already bankrupt.  
 
                                                 
99 Insolvency Act 2006, s 363. 
100 Section 363(2) and Insolvency (Personal Insolvency) Regulations 2007, reg 65. 
101 Section 367(1). 
102 Section 369(1). 
103 Section 369(2)(c). 
104 Section 377. 
105 Section 373. 
106 Section 377(2). 
107 Insolvency Act 2006, ss 312 – 324. 
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The New Zealand Law Commission Report108 recommended that the 
monopoly held by the Official Assignee on managing New Zealand insolvencies 
come to an end. This did not occur, and the Official Assignee still holds this 
monopoly under the current Insolvency Act. 
 
Both ss 315 and 333 appear to have the same key steps attached to them, in 
that there is a requirement: 
1. That a proposal has to be presented to creditors; 
2. that the required level of vote has been passed by the creditors; 
3. that the terms of the proposal/composition are reasonable; 
4. that the general body of creditors benefit; 
5. that there has been no misconduct on the part of the insolvent; 
6. that the proposal is expedient; 
7. that the Court finds no other reason to deny the application. 
 
E Arguments for Personal Administration 
 
Parliament has created legislated alternatives to bankruptcy with the 
Insolvency Act 2006. The logic for creating these options was based on the “increased 
trend of bankruptcies and liquidations, with continuing nil or low returns to unsecured 
creditors.”109 It was against this backdrop that the 2006 Act was developed. Arguably 
the word has developed rapidly over the last eight years since the last amendments. 
The international recession known as the “Global Financial Crisis” has occurred along 
with the rapid development of electronic currency and a continued trend towards 
consumerism. The traditional profile of the bankrupt of the 1960’s being a sole-trader 
has now morphed into being a consumer.110 International trends support the change in 
the profile of the average international bankrupt becoming increasingly a consumer 
and not a failed business person.111 In order to understand the trends in New Zealand 
insolvencies an examination of the raw data is now performed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 New Zealand Law Commission, “Insolvency Law Reform: Promoting Trust and Confidence: An 
Advisory Report to the Ministry of Economic Development, 2001, p59. 
109 Fleur Baker and Ralph Simpson, above n 35 at 119. 
110 Fleur Baker and Ralph Simpson, above n 35 at 144. 
111 Kilborne at 1 
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1. Statistics 
 
In reality the uptake of these alternative options has been astounding as the 
following table of statistics from the Insolvency Office shows:112 
Financial 
Year Ending 
Total 
Insolvencies 
Debtor 
Application 
Creditor 
Application 
No Asset 
Procedure 
Summary 
Instalment 
Order 
94 2274 1164 1110   
95 1991 994 997   
96 2130 1154 976   
97 2458 1521 937   
98 2949 1867 1082   
99 3285 2041 1244   
00 2673 1672 1001   
01 2859 1946 913   
02 2811 1937 874   
03 2800 2107 693   
04 2792 2220 572   
05 2995 2403 592   
06 3087 2540 547   
07 3594 2890 704   
08 3802 1741 763 1244 54 
09 5654 1660 904 2833 257 
10 6426 2026 1028 3026 346 
11 5596 1694 1020 2514 368 
12 4640 1397 1020 1872 351 
13 3950 1270 918 1448 314 
 
The key features of this data is firstly the rapid increase in the number of 
insolvencies across the board in the year ending 30 June 2009. This sudden increase 
correlates directly with the timing of the global financial crisis. It should also be noted 
that the figures for the year ending 30 June 2013 appear to return to the pre global 
financial crisis level of total insolvencies. This data appears to support the assumption 
that New Zealand has exited the recession. 
 
The second key feature that can be drawn from the data is the strong uptake of 
the No Asset Procedure. Approximately 37% of all insolvencies were a No Asset 
Procedure. Prior to the No Asset Procedure being an alternative, these insolvents 
would only have found relief through bankruptcy. The popularity of this alternative, 
                                                 
112 Insolvency and Trustee Service Insolvency Statistics and Debtor Profile Report (1 July 2012 to 30 
June 2013) at page 2. Able to be viewed at http://www.insolvency.govt.nz/cms/site-tools/about-
us/statistics/statistical-data-reports/ITS-Statistical-Data-Report-12-13.pdf 
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in large part due, to the size range of debts that it covers ($1,000 - $40,000), has seen 
a direct reduction in the number of bankruptcies without increasing the overall 
number of insolvencies. The popularity of this scheme is argued, as being the fact that 
the debt range covered allows for a major proportion of insolvents to be included. In 
order to prove this point the following comparative table is used to compare 
insolvency numbers as a percentage of population across the last seven years:113 
 
Annual Rate of Personal Insolvency 
Financial Year 
Ending 
Estimated 
Population* 
Personal 
Insolvencies 
Rate of Personal 
Insolvencies** 
07 3,321,200 3,594 0.11% 
08 3,362,100 3,802 0.11% 
09 3,402,400 5,654 0.17% 
10 3,452,500 6,426 0.19% 
11 3,495,900 5,596 0.16% 
12 3,528,300 4,640 0.13% 
13 3,579,900 3,950 0.11% 
* Estimated resident population aged 15+ 
** Rate of personal insolvencies for population aged 15+ 
 
These figures clearly demonstrate that apart from the increased number of 
insolvencies over the period of the global financial crisis, the actual uptake of 
insolvency relief has remained static, thereby dispelling any theory of floodgates 
being opened with a more rehabilitative insolvency regime. In fact the argument can 
be advanced on the statistics that having alternatives for insolvents has actually made 
the system more efficient, in that a No Asset Procedure takes one year for the Official 
Assignee to administer compared to the three years a bankruptcy takes to administer. 
 
The proposition advanced in this thesis is that the addition of a personal 
administration scheme will not increase the number of insolvencies. It will however 
provide a greater opportunity for creditors to receive a dividend then the current 
model. The statistics support that the percentage of the population that avail 
themselves of insolvency relief has not increased by virtue of perceived easy 
alternatives historically. It therefore stands that any additional reforms to insolvency 
legislation are unlikely to result in a tide of applications. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 Insolvency and Trustee Service Insolvency Statistics and Debtor Profile Report (1 July 2012 to 30 
June 2013) at page 5. Able to be viewed at http://www.insolvency.govt.nz/cms/site-tools/about-
us/statistics/statistical-data-reports/ITS-Statistical-Data-Report-12-13.pdf 
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V Chapter 13 
 
In order to be able to suggest alternative approaches to bankruptcy laws in 
New Zealand, examination of foreign regimes is required. The leading foreign regime 
is that of the US. Its bankruptcy legislation represents the one of the oldest codified 
regimes in the world. This thesis does not attempt to provide an in depth analysis of 
the code but instead uses the code as a ‘yardstick’ to measure alternative concepts, 
models and insolvency alternatives. This chapter will focus on the mechanics of 
Chapter 13 (the US alternative to personal bankruptcy). Entry into the scheme, 
compliance with the scheme and exit from the scheme are all examined. The 
involvement of stakeholders is studied with reference to their rights, returns and 
remedies during the Chapter 13 process. Special discussion is had on the position of 
secured creditors within the Chapter 13 environment and the effects that the ‘cram 
down’ provisions on their respective securities. The important discussion is to what 
happens when Chapter 13 schemes fail and how they convert to bankruptcy (in the US 
this is defined and controlled by Chapter 7). 
 
A Chapter 13 Process 
 
The “Bankruptcy Code” was enacted by Congress in 1978 as a mechanism for 
dealing with a variety of situations of insolvency. The code covers individual and 
corporate insolvencies and provides a variety of alternatives for each to consider. The 
“Bankruptcy Code” has come about by Congress exercising its powers under Article 
1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution which authorises Congress to enact 
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies”.  
 
Chapter 13 bankruptcies are designed specifically for individuals. 
Corporations and partnerships are not eligible for Chapter 13 relief, they are dealt 
with under other parts of the bankruptcy code. Chapter 13 offers a viable alternative 
to Chapter 7 bankruptcies, which conforms more with the traditional bankruptcy 
model where most property and chattels are lost. Chapter 13114 allows insolvents the 
ability to retain their home and to potentially estop mortgagee sales proceedings if 
strict criteria are followed. The result can allow the insolvent to resolve mortgage 
                                                 
114 Prior to 1993, bankruptcy judges had the power to cram-down mortgage loans. The 
prohibition on cram-down of mortgages in bankruptcy is based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank, 508 US 324 (1993) and on 11 U.S.C. § 
1322(b)(2), which prevents bankruptcy judges from discharging any mortgage debt secured 
only by a primary residence, even if the value of the house is below the mortgage principle. 
11 U.S.C. §1322(c)(1) allows debtors to cure defaults on their mortgages in Chapter 13, as 
long as the residence has not been sold in foreclosure. 
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defaults and arrears within the Chapter 13 plan. The insolvent is still obliged to make 
all mortgage payments as they fall due during the Chapter 13 bankruptcy period. 
 
The Chapter 13 plan also has an effect on other secured loans in that it allows 
the insolvent to reset the payment over those loans over the life of the Chapter 13 
plan115. This alleviates cash flow pressures in that the individual payments reduce in 
value per payment as they are made over the life of the plan.  
 
The final advantages of the Chapter 13 plan relate to protection of co-debtors, 
guarantors and co-signatories. These parties are not liable for the debt to be called 
against them under the Chapter 13 plan116. This is a significant benefit of Chapter 13. 
By using an independent Trustee to administer the Chapter 13 plan, potential 
personality issues are removed from the situation. This is because the insolvent makes 
all their respective payments directly to the Trustee. It is the role of the Trustee to 
administer the Chapter 13 plan and make all payments under the plan to creditors. 
 
To be eligible for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy an individual has to be a wage 
earner; being self-employed or operating an unincorporated business is also 
acceptable. It is the ability to demonstrate a regular income stream that allows for a 
plan to be developed to pay all or part of the insolvent’s debts. This plan usually lasts 
for between 3 and 5 years depending on the circumstances surrounding the insolvent’s 
income. 
 
In addition to the regular income component the insolvent must also have 
secured debts of less than $1,081,400 and unsecured debts of less than $360,0475117. 
These amounts are adjusted from time to time to reflect movements in the consumer 
price index. The insolvent is barred from entering a Chapter 13 bankruptcy if they 
have’ in the 180 days prior to filing an application to enter a Chapter 13 arrangement, 
been in default or failed to comply with any other creditor or debtor initiated 
bankruptcy proceedings118. 
 
The final gateway provision for entry into a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is 
education. This provision is not limited to Chapter 13 as it applies to all the chapters 
of the Bankruptcy Code relating to individuals. The insolvent must, within the 
proceeding 180 day of entering into the plan, attend counselling from an approved 
credit counselling agency.119 
                                                 
115 11 U.S.C. §1322(c)(1). 
116 11 U.S.C. §1301(a). 
117 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). 
118 11 U.S.C. §109, 111. 
119 11 U.S.C. §109(g). 
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It is argued that the inference from the wording and the general eligibility 
criteria makes Chapter 13 a rehabilitative process rather than a punitive process. The 
insolvent is rewarded for making a plan and sticking with it. By adding an educational 
component to the Bankruptcy Code’s eligibility it is clear that Congress is trying to 
aid insolvents with compliance of the plan and prevent further instances of insolvency 
in the future. 
 
The actual process of Chapter 13 starts with the insolvent filing a petition with 
their local Bankruptcy Court. The insolvent is also normally required to file120: 
 
(b) SCHEDULES, STATEMENTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 
REQUIRED. 
(1) Except in a chapter 9 municipality case, the debtor, unless 
the court orders otherwise, shall file the following schedules, 
statements, and other documents, prepared as prescribed by 
the appropriate Official Forms, if any: 
(A) schedules of assets and liabilities; 
(B) a schedule of current income and expenditures; 
(C) a schedule of executory contracts and unexpired leases; 
(D) a statement of financial affairs; 
(E) copies of all payment advices or other evidence of 
payment, if any, received by the debtor from an employer 
within 60 days before the filing of the petition, with redaction 
of all but the last four digits of the debtor's social-security 
number or individual taxpayer-identification number; and 
(F) a record of any interest that the debtor has in an account 
or program of the type specified in §521(c) of the Code. 
 
Along with these documents the insolvent must file proof of attending the 
abovementioned credit counselling program. If the insolvent has developed a plan 
during the counselling program this should also be filed. On filing, the insolvent must 
pay the prescribed filing fee and the associated miscellaneous administrative fee. 
Although these fees are modest (less than $300 at the time of writing), it is accepted 
that the insolvent may not have this money to cover the fees on filing, so there is the 
                                                 
120 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure § 1007(b). 
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provision for the insolvent to apply to the Court to pay the fees by instalments over a 
period of time not exceeding 120 days.121 
 
If a married couple wish to file a petition for a Chapter 13 plan, they can elect 
to do so jointly or individually122. However if just one party elects to file for Chapter 
13 relief full financial details have to be provided for the spouse of the applicant in 
order for the Court and creditors to understand the financial situation of the 
household. 
 
Once the petition has been filed with the Court, a Trustee is appointed. This 
Trustee should be impartial as their role is to administer the Chapter 13 plan.123 They 
also have the role of evaluating the case for the Court along with calling the meeting 
of all creditors. This creditors’ meeting should occur sometime between 21 and 50 
days after the filing of the petition with the Court124. 
 
The creditors’ meeting provides an opportunity for both the Trustee and 
creditors to examine the insolvent about the circumstances that lead to the insolvency 
and the plan itself. The insolvent is on oath whilst this examination occurs.125  
 
B The Chapter 13 Plan 
 
Creditors fall into three broad groups for all bankruptcies regardless, of 
jurisdiction. These groups are: priority creditors, secured creditors and unsecured 
creditors. For a Chapter 13 plan to be approved by the Court it must deal with all of 
these groups of creditors correctly as per the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Priority creditors are those who have a priority claim as prescribed by 
bankruptcy law. Debts such as taxes and the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings are 
included in this category. The plan filed by the insolvent must pay all priority 
creditors in full unless a particular creditor agrees to be treated differently. There are 
some exceptions such as domestic support obligations which can be dealt with over a 
five year plan if the insolvent agrees to pay all disposable income under the plan126. 
 
Secured creditors are those that hold a security over property or a chattel. If 
the insolvent wishes to keep the item which is subject to the security, the Chapter 13 
                                                 
121 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure § 1006(b)(2). 
122 11 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
123 11 U.S.C. §1302. 
124 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure § 2003(a). 
125 11 U.S.C. § 343.  
126 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a). 
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plan must provide that the secured creditor receives at least the value of collateral. 
However if the loan or financial obligation was entered into shortly before the filing 
of the petition, the insolvent will be liable to pay the value of the debt rather than the 
depreciated value of the asset. Secured creditors whose obligations last longer than 
the proposed plan such as mortgages are still able to be included in the plan 
notwithstanding the existence of the obligation after discharge. From a practical 
perspective an agreed rearrangement of the debt and on going obligations is required 
during the plan. 
  
Unsecured creditors enjoy no such protections under a Chapter 13 plan. The 
plan need not pay unsecured creditors in full as long as the plan provides for the 
insolvent paying all “disposable income” over an “applicable commitment period”. It 
is further a requirement that all unsecured creditors receive at least as much as they 
would under a full Chapter 7 bankruptcy127.  “Disposable income” is described as128: 
 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term “disposable 
income” means current monthly income received by the 
debtor (other than child support payments, foster care 
payments, or disability payments for a dependent child made 
in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the 
extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child) 
less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—  
(A)  
(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a 
dependent of the debtor, or for a domestic support 
obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the 
petition is filed; and  
(ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition 
of “charitable contribution” under section 548 (d)(3)) to 
a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization 
(as defined in section 548 (d)(4)) in an amount not to 
exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the 
year in which the contributions are made; and  
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of 
expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and 
operation of such business.  
 
“Applicable commitment period” is defined as129: 
 
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), shall be—  
(i) 3 years; or  
(ii) not less than 5 years, if the current monthly income 
of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse combined, when 
multiplied by 12, is not less than—  
                                                 
127 11 U.S.C § 1325. 
128 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) and (B). 
129 11 U.S.C. Section 1325(b)(4). 
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(I) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the 
median family income of the applicable State for 1 
earner;  
(II) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 
individuals, the highest median family income of the 
applicable State for a family of the same number or 
fewer individuals; or  
(III) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 
individuals, the highest median family income of the 
applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, 
plus $525 per month for each individual in excess of 4; 
and  
(B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable 
under subparagraph (A), but only if the plan provides for 
payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter 
period.  
 
It is curious that the length of time that the insolvent is subject to the Chapter 
13 plan is subject to a means test that requires the higher income earner to be in the 
plan for longer. It is arguable that this creates a level of unfairness, however on closer 
scrutiny it appears that those that are most able to pay do so, whilst those less able to 
pay are spared any prolonged hardship that the Chapter 13 plan may create. 
 
C Chapter 13 and the Court 
 
One of the key components of the Chapter 13 regime is that it is subject to 
judicial scrutiny prior to approval130. This important step provides all parties with a 
level of confidence that the Chapter 13 plan complies with the requisite law, and is 
therefore in the general interests of the relevant stakeholders as recognised by 
Congress. Like many Court processes there is a requirement that strict timeframes are 
adhered to. The insolvent must start making payments to the Trustee within 30 days 
of filing the petition even if the Chapter 13 plan has not yet been approved131. The 
Court must hold a confirmation hearing within 45 days of the creditors’ meeting.132 It 
appears from these timeframes that there is an intended period for the Court and 
Trustee to be satisfied that the insolvent is honouring the Chapter 13 plan even though 
it is not yet binding. This clearly provides the Court with a level of comfort as to the 
workability of the plan and the insolvent’s intent to adhere to it. 
 
If the Court does approve the plan, it becomes binding on all creditors no 
matter which class they are from; equally it is also binding on the insolvent133. An 
important element of the Chapter 13 bargain is the treatment of future unexpected 
                                                 
130 11 U.S.C. § 1325. 
131 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). 
132 11 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1325. 
133 11 U.S.C. § 1327. 
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income or other windfalls that the insolvent may receive. The bargain according to 
Carlson is that the “[insolvent] buys back property of the estate (valued as of the time 
of the confirmation hearing) in exchange for post-petition income.”134 Chapter 13 
allows for the post-petition income level to change,135 therefore any additional income 
is placed into the plan. Items such as lottery winnings are considered as income so 
therefore must be contributed to the Chapter 13 plan. On the other hand an inheritance 
post confirmation is not considered income so the insolvent is able to retain this asset, 
with no recourse from creditors.  
 
Whilst the insolvent may be able to retain some windfalls post-confirmation 
they are not able to acquire any further indebtedness. The reasons for this appear to be 
highly pragmatic, in that the additional debt servicing may compromise the 
insolvent’s ability to honour their commitments as contained in the Chapter 13 plan. 
Whilst this is not an absolute forbiddance, the insolvent can gain approval of the 
Trustee if a specific debt is required to be entered into. 
 
 
D Discharge from Chapter 13 
 
During the course of the Chapter 13 plan the insolvent must make their 
required payments to the Trustee. For employed individuals it is usual that the 
contributions are deducted directly from their pay at source; this increases the 
likelihood of compliance. If the insolvent makes all of the required payments under 
the Chapter 13 plan, then they are entitled to discharge if they have complied with all 
of the additional conditions contained within 11 U.S.C. § 1328.136 If the insolvent has 
complied then they will be discharged, which releases them from all of their debts 
contained within the Chapter 13 plan137. On discharge, creditors’ lose any ability to 
enforce their debts; in essence the debt is wiped. Discharge marks the end of the 
Chapter 13 process.  
 
E Failure to Complete a Chapter 13 Plan 
 
There exists a multitude of reasons that a Chapter 13 plan cannot be 
completed. The most common one is that the insolvent is unwilling or unable to adjust 
to the tight budgets that the plan entails. If an insolvent is unable to complete their 
                                                 
134 David Gray Carlson, “The Chapter 13 Estate and Its Discontents” (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
233 at 248. 
135 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1). 
136 Conditions may include the debtor completing an instructional course concerning personal financial 
management described in section 111 and not being subject to being charged with any felony. 
137 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c). 
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Chapter 13 plan, the insolvent faces the prospect of the plan being converted to a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy instead. Chapter 7 bankruptcy is essentially a liquidation 
bankruptcy in that the insolvent is not able to retain any property or chattels except 
those few allowed by the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
The conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is however unfortunately not as 
simple as it might seem on the surface. One of the advantages of a codified regime is 
that it provides a level of certainty; the problem arises when two pieces of the code sit 
in contrast with each other. Unfortunately this occurs in cases where there is a 
conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. The wording contained within 11 U.S.C. § 
1306(a) states138: 
 
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in 
section 541 of this title—  
(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the 
debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before 
the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under 
chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first; and  
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the 
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, 
dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of 
this title, whichever occurs first.  
 
This section in isolation indicates that the property of the Chapter 13 estate 
contains all of the insolvent’s property until discharge occurs. However when this 
section is compared to 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) this states:139 
 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the 
plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in 
the debtor. 
 
A clear level of confusion can be found when these two sections are placed 
side by side. This is a legal nullity if the Chapter 13 plan is completed however in 
instances when it is not there is potential for trouble. Carlson concludes that the key to 
the discussion is the meaning of the word “vest” and the concept of “vesting”. Carlson 
concludes that “vesting” is a way of saying “transferring absolutely.”140 
 
These differences go beyond pointing to mere drafting peculiarities; they go to 
key judicial questions on conversion from one form of bankruptcy to another. The 
importance of these questions relates to the assets just prior to approval of the plan 
                                                 
138 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a). 
139 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b). 
140 Carlson, above n 134 at 241. 
41 
 
and those assets acquired after the plan have been accepted. Which assets then go on 
to form part of the Chapter 7 liquidation? The answer is as follows141: 
 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under chapter 13 of 
this title is converted to a case under another chapter under this title—  
(A) property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of 
property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the petition, that 
remains in the possession of or is under the control of the debtor 
on the date of conversion;  
(B) valuations of property and of allowed secured claims in the 
chapter 13 case shall apply only in a case converted to a case 
under chapter 11 or 12, but not in a case converted to a case 
under chapter 7, with allowed secured claims in cases under 
chapters 11 and 12 reduced to the extent that they have been paid 
in accordance with the chapter 13 plan; and  
(C) with respect to cases converted from chapter 13—  
(i) the claim of any creditor holding security as of the 
date of the filing of the petition shall continue to be 
secured by that security unless the full amount of such 
claim determined under applicable nonbankruptcy law 
has been paid in full as of the date of conversion, 
notwithstanding any valuation or determination of the 
amount of an allowed secured claim made for the 
purposes of the case under chapter 13; and  
(ii) unless a prebankruptcy default has been fully cured 
under the plan at the time of conversion, in any 
proceeding under this title or otherwise, the default shall 
have the effect given under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law.  
 
Whilst there exist a number of perplexing contradictions within the 
Bankruptcy Code there is also enough clarity to allow judicial discretion to achieve a 
practical outcome. The salient point for the purpose of my thesis is that if a Chapter 
13 plan is unable to be completed there is a mechanism for its conversion to Chapter 
7. 
 
F Secured Creditors and Chapter 13 
 
Secured creditors by virtue of holding a security for their respective debt have 
to be treated differently than their unsecured counterparts.  The true power of Chapter 
13 lies in the ability of insolvents to deal with secured creditors in a manner that 
forces their debt to be “crammed down”. This subsection takes the time to study the 
mechanics of Chapter 13 and its treatment of secured creditors, whether the security 
be held over real property or a chattel the different approaches are discussed. 
 
                                                 
141 11 U.S.C. 348(f). 
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Filing for a Chapter 13 does not directly assist the home owning insolvent. 
This is because under the law they are still required to repay their mortgages in full or 
give up their homes. Prior to 1993, bankruptcy judges had the power to cram down 
mortgage loans secured against the insolvent’s principle residence. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nobleman142 and the wording of 11 U.S.C §1322(b)(2) now 
restrict this from occurring. The wording of 11 U.S.C §1322(b)(2) states: 
 
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim 
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s 
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave 
unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims; 
 
These now have the combined effect of preventing the Court from cramming 
down mortgages secured against principal residences, even in situations where the 
value of the property is less than the mortgage value143. All is not lost for the 
insolvent as 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1) states the following: 
 
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2) and applicable nonbankruptcy 
law—  
 
(1) a default with respect to, or that gave rise to, a lien on the 
debtor’s principal residence may be cured under paragraph (3) or 
(5) of subsection (b) until such residence is sold at a foreclosure 
sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable 
nonbankruptcy law; and  
 
 
This section provides the following effective relief for the insolvent. Firstly 
the bank is prevented from taking any further enforcement action. This happens upon 
the filing of the application with the Court, which prevents the bank from foreclosing 
on the property. The insolvent is then able to retain their home if they are able to 
repay the mortgage arrears and make good all on going payments as they fall due. 
This is all done as part of a payment plan which can last up to five years. Once the 
arrears have been repaid the original mortgage contract is once again followed. A 
further benefit of Chapter 13 is that the Trustee has the power to investigate the fees 
charged by lenders. If the fees are found to be excessive the Trustee may aid the 
insolvent in challenging these fees.144 Porter went further to state that she found that 
in about half of cases where foreclosure had occurred or was imminent, that 
questionable or excessive fees had been charged by the lender. The insolvent’s cash 
                                                 
142 Nobleman v. American Savings Bank 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
143 Michelle J. White and Ning Zhu, “Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy” (2010) J. Legal 
Stud. U. Chi. 33 at 37. 
144 John Eggman, Katherine Porter and Tara Twomey. “Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing 
Affordability and Loan Modification” (2008) Utah L. Rev. 1123. 
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flow position is also improved by the filing of a Chapter 13 application. This is 
because in most cases the insolvent is released from their obligations to unsecured 
creditors. With this release the insolvent has more disposable cash to meet their 
mortgage obligations. The essence of this provision means that insolvents are 
rewarded for having a larger mortgage. For every dollar more of mortgage debt that 
an insolvent has they are released from a dollar of unsecured debt under the Chapter 
13 plan. This was suggested by White and Zhu as an unintended consequence of the 
2005 reforms145. 
 
Judgement liens are common in the US. As a result many insolvents have liens 
registered against their property by the time they have to make a decision about filing 
under the bankruptcy code. Insolvents have a choice under the bankruptcy code as to 
which chapter they file under. Chapter 13 “provides more options for stripping liens 
as compared to Chapter 7.”146 Whereas in contrast White and Zhu observe:147 
 
Financially distressed debtors who file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 
receive little help in saving their homes because filing under Chapter 7 
does not prevent mortgage lenders from foreclosing or allow debtors to 
spread out repayment of arrears. However Chapter 7 helps homeowners 
who do not wish to save their homes because their unsecured debt is 
discharged and they are not required to repay anything from their future 
incomes. 
 
This is not to say that an insolvent could not potentially use Chapter 7 to 
negotiate with their mortgage lenders. However the limitation is that the mortgage 
arrears usually must be paid in a very short timeframe, and it is therefore unlikely that 
a lender would grant extensions without being obliged to do so by legislation. 
Therefore Chapter 13 is known as the “home owner’s bankruptcy”. Statistics support 
this statement in that “96 percent of Chapter 13 filers are homeowners and 77 percent 
of debtors file under Chapter 13 voluntarily”148 The success rate for filers of Chapter 
13 plans according to White and Zhu is around 79 percent. This is obviously a very 
successful result from an economic and social standpoint. Mortgage lenders are 
getting repaid their arrears and loans are back on track while society is not burdened 
with people displaced from their homes and communities are not burdened with 
foreclosed properties that may be difficult to sell creating a hangout for vagrants. 
 
What is the impact on secured creditors who hold a security over a motor 
vehicle? Chapter 13 does provide a solution for these creditors. The question at its 
                                                 
145 White and Zhu, above n 143 at 38. 
146 Mark S. Zuckerberg and Amanda K. Quick, “Stripping in Bankruptcy” (2012) 56 Res Gestae 
Indiana Bar Journal (Indiana State Bar Association December 2012) 39. 
147 White and Zhu, above n 143 at 37. 
148 At 37. 
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root is one of valuation and which valuation technique should be used. In the case of 
Associates Commercial Corp v. Rash149 the court had to determine which way 
valuation should be carried out. Should it be carried out on the basis of what the 
creditor would receive under a foreclosure sale or should it be determined on the cost 
of replacement of comparable property? The Court ultimately decided by majority of 
eight to one that valuation should occur on a replacement basis.  
 
The result of Rash mean that the value attributed to a secured motor vehicle is 
almost invariably less than the value of the debt owed to the creditor. This gave rise to 
the potential situation where the insolvent could incur debts knowingly prior to filing 
a plan and retain an asset without having to pay its full value. This occurred through 
an insolvent acquiring an asset that had a substantial depreciation component. The 
value of the security was often less than the value of the debt. Therefore under a 
Chapter 13 plan the secured portion of the debt was only ascribed the depreciated 
security value whilst the remainder of the debt was treated as unsecured. This 
unsecured portion often was completely lost to the creditor on discharge of the 
insolvent from the plan. Motor vehicles with their high rate of depreciation were an 
asset that often fell into this category. 
 
The legislature under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) combated this potential for abuse with the addition 
of what is known as the hanging paragraph. Abuse could take many forms but 
included the idea that debtors were incurring debts and were deliberately not 
honouring them and seeking refuge under what could be viewed as soft insolvency 
rules.  
 
The hanging paragraph is so called because it has no numerical reference 
within the code it just sits there. It also does not relate to any of the points made in the 
previously numbered section. The “hanging paragraph” states150: 
 
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim 
described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security 
interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was 
incurred within the 910-day period preceding the date of the filing of the 
petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as 
defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the 
debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if 
the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 
 
 
                                                 
149 Associates Commercial Corp v. Rash 520 U.U. 953 (1997). 
150 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
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The addition of this “hanging paragraph” is very significant for Chapter 13, as 
all secured debts have to be accounted for and paid in full unless there is cram-down. 
The key questions that this then gives rise to relate specifically to whether the 
“hanging paragraph” applies or not. The wording of the paragraph itself is express as 
to the timeframes when the obligation was entered into. It is further express about the 
fact the vehicle has to be for personal use and that the debt has to be a purchase 
money security interest (PMSI). But what is a PMSI and how is it defined? Collins151 
indicates that the vast majority of Courts have held that a PMSI should draw its 
meaning from U.C.C. § 9-103152. The application of the definition by way of Collins 
example is straightforward:153 
 
[A] seller of goods retaining an interest in those goods to secure the 
payment of all or some of the price of those goods. Third-party lenders 
can also retain a PMSI in a consumer good. This occurs when they make 
advances or incur obligations “to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or 
the use of the collateral” where those advances or obligations are “in fact 
so used” to acquire rights in that collateral. 
 
In situations the application of the PMSI classification results in a negative, 
where the security held is worth less than the debt owed for it. If a negative equity 
situation occurs it must be determined whether the negative equity formed part of the 
‘purchase price” or if the negative equity “enabled the debtor to acquire rights”154. 
The issues run deeper in that the question of the classification of this negative equity 
has not been resolved with any clarity by the courts. The current level of discourse on 
this provides a lack of certainty for both insolvents and creditors, with both parties 
facing significant litigation expense to answer this question. There exists considerable 
material on this debate which falls outside the scope of this paper. The key point is 
that there is no clear direction from the Court how a PMSI should be treated where 
negative equity exists. 
 
The treatment of secured creditors under Chapter 13 plans is unique and 
different. Chapter 13 provides considerable benefit to the homeowner and allows 
                                                 
151 Geoffrey M Collins “Negative Equity and Purchase Money Security Interests Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code and BAPCA” (2009) 95 Cornell L. Rev. 161 at 163. 
152 Uniform Commercial Code section 9-103. 
153 Collins, above n 151 at 163. 
154 Uniform Commercial Code section 9-103(a)(2). 
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many situations where the family home can be saved through the use of Chapter 13. 
The “cram down” aspect of the Chapter 13 has been undermined by the “hanging 
paragraph” especially in cases relating to motor vehicles. Chapter 13 however still 
maintains a level of potency despite the uncertainties created by the “hanging 
paragraph”.   
 
 
G Stakeholders and Chapter 13 
 
Chapter 13 provides a number of protections for all stakeholders to the 
insolvency. It firstly contains a codified process which all parties have the opportunity 
to access to understand their respective rights and obligations. Creditors of all classes 
have the opportunity to examine the insolvent under oath about the plan and the 
background to the insolvency155. Creditors also have the right to have their objections 
heard by the Court. The creditors are given 28 days’ notice of the Court fixture so 
have ample opportunity to object156. Priority creditors still retain their preferential 
status, secured creditors retain their security and a minimum level of repayment based 
on the security they hold and unsecured creditors are guaranteed a greater return then 
they would enjoy under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
 
Insolvents are given immediate relief from creditor action on filing the 
petition; they are also obligated to commence payments within 30 days of filing. The 
insolvent is subjected to the scrutiny of the Court, trustee and creditors. Insolvents are 
incentivised to make a Chapter 13 plan work by being able to retain their assets 
thereby creating a level of certainty for creditors. There are also clear consequences 
when an insolvent is forced to convert to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
 
The trustee is independent of the insolvent and is there for compliance 
purposes. The trustee administers the plan and collects and distributes the funds as 
required. This creates a distance between the insolvent from the vitriol of creditors 
thereby reducing the stress on the insolvent. 
 
H Conclusions on Chapter 13 
 
Chapter 13 provides a mechanism for dealing with insolvency as a real 
alternative to liquidation bankruptcy. Whilst the system may not be perfect and is 
often criticised as favouring insolvents, it does provide an alternative that is viable. 
                                                 
155 11 U.S.C. § 343. 
156 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002(b). 
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Unique features such as the cram down of secured creditors provides for an option 
that allows insolvents the ability to retain major assets. The system rewards insolvents 
whilst also providing creditors with more than they would otherwise enjoy. 
 
A version of Chapter13 is a real alternative that could be imported to a 
jurisdiction like New Zealand. New Zealand would of course have the benefit of 30 
odd years of US experience so could refine the wording to avoid some of the 
contradictions contained in the existing wording of Chapter 13. It is through this 
process of refinement that this paper will develop a New Zealand model for personal 
administration. 
 
 
VI Gateways 
 
A Introduction 
 
Gateways are an important legal tool used by the legislature to control entry 
into or exit from various schemes and programs as sanctioned by the state. A gateway 
has a literal meaning in that it is something that has to be passed through before 
entering into the next section of whatever the gateway is controlling. In insolvency 
law gateways are common tools used to control entry into and exit from bankruptcy. 
A good example of a gateway is the credit counselling requirement before an 
individual can enter into a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.157 
 
Gateways are used as tools for a variety of differing reasons. This chapter is 
going to look at the various types of gateways and how they are being used in a 
variety of different jurisdictions. The public policy of gateway use is also tied into the 
various interests of stakeholders. This chapter will introduce a number of new 
jurisdictions. However the focus of the discussion of those jurisdictions will be 
limited to gateways and the evolution of those systems. 
 
The purpose for this thesis to study gateways is to establish if a gateway or a 
series of gateways are going to assist the proposed amendments to the New Zealand 
insolvency regime. If a gateway could be identified that aided in the efficient 
administration of insolvencies then it would clearly benefit the proposed model. 
 
B Types of Gateways 
 
For the purpose of categorising gateways this section has broken them into 
three distinct types as follows: 
                                                 
157 11 U.S.C. §§ 109,111. 
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The restrictive gateway – designed to limit access to a bankruptcy regime. 
Such restrictive gateways involve steps that the insolvent has to complete or comply 
with in order to enter the scheme. Whilst some of these gateways are not onerous in 
their own right, the cumulative effect of them can make access to bankruptcy regimes 
a real barrier. An example of a restrictive gateway is the requirement for an individual 
to undergo credit counselling prior to entering into a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
 
The Shepherding Gateway – has the purpose of sending people down a 
specific path with their bankruptcy. This type of gateway places certain criteria on 
entry into one scheme which if not complied with forces the individual into another 
scheme. This could be the division from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in 
the US system, or it could be the different length of time in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 
based on the bankrupt’s income. 
 
The restrictive exit – is a far more subtle feature of bankruptcy regimes. There 
is a relatively universal approach to allowing a clean slate on exit from bankruptcy. 
However there exist a number of tools that the state or the trustee of the bankrupt 
estate can use to extend the bankruptcy period, thereby preventing or at least delaying 
the clean slate benefits that the bankrupt would enjoy on discharge. Some of these 
restrictions on discharge relate to the conduct of the individual during their 
bankruptcy while others can be used as punitive measures to punish conduct that led 
to the bankruptcy. In New Zealand a good example of a restrictive exit is a situation 
where the court grants a discharge but restricts the business activities that the 
discharged bankrupt can engage in.158 
 
As the various jurisdictions are discussed during this section the various types 
of gateways included in those systems will be examined along with the cultural norms 
of each jurisdiction.  
 
C Gateways in Practice - Continental Europe 
 
Continental Europe is made up of a variety of different jurisdictions and a 
variety of different cultural backgrounds. Detailed analysis of these markets is 
challenging for this author because of the language barriers associated with the 
secondary materials from these differing jurisdictions. Instead the focus of this thesis 
will be to highlight the key features of each system and any recent developments 
therein. 
 
                                                 
158 Insolvency Act 2006, s 299. 
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1 France 
 
The French systems for dealing with personal bankruptcy have grown and 
developed rapidly over the last twenty years and are now one of the most efficient at 
dealing with personal bankruptcy. This efficiency has been created through a 
streamlined process that places a substantial amount of power with the regional 
commissioner under the commission on an individual over indebtedness which is 
administered principally by the Banque de France.159  
 
Historically the first (but now out dated) tool used to curb overindebtedness 
was that the commission would work with the insolvent to develop a plan for the 
insolvent’s affairs. This plan usually required concessions from creditors such as 
interest write offs, interest concessions, extensions on payment time frames and other 
forms of relief. The commission had the power to recommend these plans to the Court 
for enforcement if creditors did not voluntarily accept them. This system had one 
major weakness in that many insolvents, despite the relief offered, were still unable to 
break from their overindebtedness. As such they would often find themselves back 
before the commission trying to develop a more robust set of concessions. This 
system created many recidivist users who would continually be back before the 
commission without being able to resolve the underlying debt burden and its lack of 
sustainability. 
 
The first major reform of this system introduced a compelled discharge 
as a form of relief. Beginning in 1999, the commissions could 
recommend the “extraordinary” measure of a global deferral of all debts 
for three years (in 2004, reduced to two years). After this period, if the 
commission’s repeat evaluation revealed that the debtor was still unable 
to resolve a situation of financial distress using traditional “ordinary” 
measures of payment extensions, etc. The commission could recommend 
that the court impose a partial or total discharge of the unmanageable 
debt burden.160 
 
The French then further fine-tuned the system in 2004 with the added ability 
of the commission to discharge insolvents of all of their debts, if the insolvent had all 
of their non-exempt assets liquidated. This process could only be instigated if the 
insolvent was in an “irremediably compromised”161 financial situation. This process 
was called “procedure of personal recovery”, Kilborn notes that this program 
                                                 
159 Jason Kilborn, “La Responsabilisation de l’Economie: What the United States Can Learn From the 
New French Law on Consumer Overindebtedness” (2005) 26 Mich. J. Int’l L 619 at 637. 
160 Jason Kilborn, “Still Chasing Chimeras But Finally Slaying Some Dragons In the Quest for 
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform” (2012) 25 Loy. Consumer L. Rev 1 at26. 
161 At 26. 
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“resembles quite closely a U.S. Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy”162 with no 
rehabilitation plan. 
 
In 2010 the French system became even more efficient. The previous 
requirement for the court to approve composition plans as developed by the 
commission with the insolvent was dropped. Instead the commission had the power to 
impose the plans on creditors without the courts approval. This automatically freed up 
a considerable amount of court time. Creditors who were unhappy with the 
commission for imposing such a compromise measure on them did have a right of 
appeal to the court.163 
 
The 2010 reforms also further streamlined the “procedure of personal 
recovery”. The process of providing the court with inventories of assets that were 
non-exempt in liquidation was dispensed with. Instead the commission was granted 
the power to assess these cases and make an immediate recommendation to the court 
for discharge, which the court merely confirms as long as there is no creditor 
objection. This approach to dealing with such insolvents appears to be entirely 
practical as the vast majority of insolvents have no assets or the cost of administering 
their insolvency would outweigh the value of any assets that they do have. 
 
The French have over the last twenty years removed most of the gateways 
within their insolvency regime. The current French systems focus on the commission 
as being the main gateway. The commission can shepherd insolvents down a variety 
of routes with the court being kept free for the purpose of confirming the 
commission’s findings rather than developing its own. 
 
2 Sweden 
 
Historically the Swedish had a three step process, with all of the steps being a 
compulsory component prior to any form of relief being offered. There appears, from 
the literature, to be a general concern across Scandinavian culture of potential abuse 
of any insolvency regime that offers any form of discharge.164 Therefore the three step 
process was developed. These steps were as follows: 
 
1. There was a compulsion for insolvents to try to reach a compromise with 
creditors. These negotiations were supported by budgetary advisors. 
                                                 
162 At 26. 
163 At 26. 
164 Jason Kilborn, “Out with the New, In with the Old: As Sweden Aggressively Streamlines Its 
Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the Learning Curve?” (2007) 80 Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 435. 
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2. Insolvents would then file with the state Enforcement Agency 
(Kronofogdigheten). The Enforcement Agency had the role of approving 
insolvents into the scheme. Insolvents who had incurred their debts through 
“irresponsible” choices such as substantial fines or consumption of luxury 
items were often deemed not suitable for relief. For those insolvents that were 
accepted the Enforcement Agency assisted with the development of a financial 
plan or composition for relief. This composition was then placed before 
creditors for their vote, which was usually in the negative. 
3. The Enforcement Agency then took the plan to court for judicial review. This 
step almost always resulted in the court approving the plan and imposing it on 
creditors. 
 
The Swedish reforms of 2007 brought in a revolutionary new approach. Firstly 
the Swedish system departed from the long held view that reaching a negotiated 
solution was an important first step. Instead the legislature recognised that in most 
situations creditors were unwilling to release insolvents from their respective 
obligations unless they had no other alternative.165 The second aspect of the reforms 
were just as practical and potent. The previous third step where the court had to 
review and the Enforcement Agency’s composition was removed. The process was 
streamlined so that the Enforcement Agency would develop the composition which 
was then automatically approved by the court. 
 
The Swedish system does not open any floodgates to discharge but instead 
provides access to a practical mechanism for financial relief that was previously 
missing. The major gateway now in the Swedish system is that of the Enforcement 
Agency as it now both develops the debt relief plan and sanctions it for court 
approval. This system does give considerable power to the gate keeper.  
 
3 Denmark  
 
Denmark in many respects has very similar cultural norms to Sweden 
regarding the perceived risk of abuse within any insolvency regime. The Danish 
reforms of 2005 in many ways blazed the trail for the Swedish reforms of 2007.  
 
The paranoia over potential abuse has led to a system that is in many ways very 
narrow and targeted and only allows in a very select group of insolvents: Kilborn 
notes:166 
 
                                                 
165 At 458. 
166 Kilborn, above n160 at 18. 
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[D]ebtors must exhibit “qualified insolvency”, which implies a complete 
impossibility, free from virtually any doubt, that debtors might right their 
own financial ships in the foreseeable future by reducing their living 
standards and applying their best efforts to paying off debt. Second, the 
court has to be convinced that the offering relief in any particular case is 
appropriate in light of a series of factors, such as the debtor’s efforts to 
manage debt problems and the composition of the debt load (preferably 
relatively few fines, penalties, and “irresponsible” debts, such as debts 
for luxury consumption). 
 
The key component of the 2005 Danish reforms was to change the 
presumption of the court. Pre 2005 the court had to look at all of the circumstances to 
see if the insolvent applicant was suitable for relief with the presumption that they 
were not. The reforms changed that presumption so that there was a presumption that 
the insolvent was suitable for relief unless demonstrated to the court otherwise. 
 
The gateway for the Danish system is the court. It is the court that determines the 
suitability of the applicant for entry into the insolvency regime. 
 
4 Germany 
 
The only aspect of the German insolvency regime noted in this section is that 
of the cost of administration. The German system for dealing with insolvency 
essentially contained a user pays component. In order to enter into the regime the 
insolvent had to have the ability to pay for the costs of the administration of their 
insolvent estate. This obviously was a substantial hurdle for most insolvents to deal 
with. The German insolvency regime was updated in 2001 to allow the cost of the 
administration to be added to the insolvent’s debts, thereby removing the cost barrier 
to entry into the scheme. The result of this update was a dramatic increase in the 
number of filings under the regime. 167 
 
The removal of the upfront administration burden opened the gateway 
significantly to insolvents wanting to avail themselves of the scheme.  
 
 
D United States of America 
 
Chapter 13 has already been discussed in a level of detail. That detail was 
focused on the mechanics of the regime and not on gateways. The gateway aspect of 
Chapter 13 will now be discussed. 
                                                 
167 Jason Kilborn, “The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief: Revolutionary 
Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States” (2004) 24 Nw. J. Int’l L. & 
Bus. 257. 
53 
 
The various entry criteria for Chapter 13 are as follows: 
 
1. It is for individuals only; corporations are dealt with under other Chapters of 
the Code; and 
2. The individual has to be a wage earner. Being self-employed is acceptable, 
and: 
3. Secured debts must be less than $1,081,400, and; 
4. Unsecured debts have to be less than $360,0475; and 
5. The insolvent must not have been in default of any other creditor or debtor 
initiated bankruptcy proceedings in the proceeding 180 days, and 
6. Have attended counselling from an approved credit counselling agency. 
 
In reviewing the above it is clear that many gateways exist that restrict entry into 
the Chapter 13 program and failure of an insolvent on any one of the grounds bars 
them from inclusion in the scheme. Those insolvents who do not fit the criteria of 
Chapter 13 may seek relief in the form of Chapter 7, which is a liquidation 
bankruptcy, if of course the insolvent meets the criteria of entry to that particular 
scheme.  
 
E Australia and New Zealand 
 
Australia and New Zealand have a number of free trade agreements such as 
Closer Economic Relations and a general unwritten understanding of the mutual 
benefits of similar policy in commercial areas of law. When New Zealand revised its 
corporate insolvency regime to incorporate a voluntary administration model it used 
the Australian legislation as a template. It is therefore not surprising that the two 
jurisdictions have many similarities in their personal insolvency regimes. 
 
Both Australia and New Zealand allow insolvents and creditors to work 
through their issues and create their own private or informal solutions. Whilst these 
informal solutions are encouraged they are not prerequisites for entry into any of the 
personal insolvency options available in each respective jurisdiction. Both 
jurisdictions also offer alternatives to bankruptcy through recognised state sanctioned 
programs. Examples in New Zealand are the No Asset Procedure, Summary 
Instalment Orders, or Proposals under Part 5 of the Insolvency Act 2006. In Australia 
there are formal Debt Agreements and Personal Insolvency Agreements.   
 
Whilst none of these alternatives to bankruptcy are gateways to bankruptcy 
they do offering a filtering system where some insolvents are able to be shepherded 
off down different paths rather than bankruptcy. Australia also has a suspension 
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program that creates a moratorium on creditor action for a short period of time to all 
insolvents to consider their various alternatives (some creditors like secured creditors 
are not stopped from continuing enforcement action under this provision). This 
moratorium is also not a gateway but rather a holding pen before further action is 
taken. 
 
Bankruptcy in both Australia and New Zealand is entered into either by the 
insolvent petitioning the local Insolvency Trustee or a creditor making an application 
to the court. Both entry mechanisms are gateways and each have criteria that the court 
or the trustee will consider prior to bankruptcy being entered into. 
 
Interestingly both jurisdictions have a three year bankruptcy, with the time 
starting for the measurement of the three years being when the trustee receives a 
completed statement of affairs. Discharge in both jurisdictions is with a clean slate 
apart from a few minor obligations such as Child Support payments (in New 
Zealand)168. Discharge can also be withheld in both countries by the trustee making an 
application to the court.  
 
Australia and New Zealand’s’ discharge provisions did diverge for a period of 
about a decade from 1991 to 2002. Australia over this period had an early discharge 
program for bankruptcy. The length of three years is of course completely arbitrary 
and has no scientific basis. Senator Gareth Evans asked the Australian Attorney 
General in 1980:169 
 
[W]hat principle, if any, has in fact guided the determination and settling 
upon the period of three years. It is just the time honoured principle that 
any longer than that would be too long, and any shorter would be too 
short? In other words, does it have an intuitive quality about it, or is there 
something more rational? 
  
The recorded response to this line of questioning was a nod from the Attorney 
General. This in my view can be taken as acceptance by the legislature that the length 
of bankruptcy prior to discharge serves no purpose other than being punitive on the 
bankrupt. Whilst there needs to be an adequate timeframe for the trustee to examine 
the affairs of the bankrupt this could conceivably be done within a shorter timeframe. 
For the purposes of a discussion on gateways it should be noted that discharge from 
bankruptcy is also a gateway. Regardless of the time spent in bankruptcy as dictated 
by the state at some point the bankrupt has to be discharged. This gateway has two 
components to it in both Australia and New Zealand. Firstly the three year time frame 
has to have elapsed. Secondly the trustee must consent to the release. The legislation 
                                                 
168 Insolvency Act 2006, s 304. 
169 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 25 March 1980, 999 (Gareth Evans). 
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in both jurisdictions creates a presumption that the trustee has agreed (tacitly) if the 
trustee has not filed an objection with the court. If such an objection has been filed it 
is up to the court to determine whether discharge should occur or be delayed.  
 
F Trends in Gateways 
 
There is a clear move in the jurisdictions of Continental Europe as discussed 
above that access to insolvency regimes should be made easier. This shift is despite 
the cultural norms of those various jurisdictions and the concerns about potential 
abuse. Gateways are as a general rule being opened to allow greater numbers of 
insolvents access to financial relief. This pattern appears to have been steady and 
consistent across these jurisdictions over the last couple of decades.  
 
The United States were the world leader in insolvency and bankruptcy 
legislation, having recognised the issues and had state sanctioned relief with ease of 
access since the nineteen seventies through the Bankruptcy Code. However the 
consumer bankruptcy reforms of 2005 resulted in a stark policy change in direction. 
Titled the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act” or BAPCPA 
the new legislation started to place considerable restrictions on what was previously 
an extremely liberal scheme.  
 
BAPCPA created two new hurdles to entering into a bankruptcy regime under 
the code. Firstly the requirement for credit counselling was added as an additional 
gateway entry criteria. Secondly the addition of a means test as a way of discovering 
potential abuse of the bankruptcy regime acts as a shepherding gateway depending on 
the two step testing process. The means test was designed to prevent immediate 
discharge from bankruptcy for Chapter 7 filers, if they had the ability to pay a 
dividend.  
 
Those insolvents who pass the means test are allowed to continue with a 
Chapter7 bankruptcy with immediate discharge. Those that fail the two step means 
test, (which contains a range of formulae based on the insolvents pre filing income 
and also their income verses state averages for the equivalent sized family minus 
presumed expenses). If the means test is failed the bankruptcy is converted to a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy where the insolvent is required to make payments from their 
income over a five year period, regardless of whether they have any assets or not. 
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The developments under BAPCPA appear to create both entry and discharge 
gateways that did not exist prior to this legislation. Kilborn, a vocal academic critic of 
these reforms, comments on the background to these reforms as follows:170 
 
Three factors converged to push an ill-conceived and poorly drafted 
reform bill through the legislative process: (1) the ebb and flow of 
politics had moved toward a more conservative position, (2) the general 
economic situation (especially investment asset values, such as home 
equity and stocks) was at all-time highs, and yet (3) annual personal 
bankruptcy filings had exceeded the psychologically important one 
million mark in 1996.  
 
It was against this backdrop that a major credit card issuing bank (MBNA) 
drafted the reform bill that lead to the BAPCPA legislation. The motivation of the 
legislation appears to be that insolvents with capacity/ability to pay were made to do 
so. The onerous and cumbersome nature of the legislation caused it to instead create 
inefficiencies and court congestion due in large part to its poor drafting.171 The 
additional cost and increased compliance is borne by all insolvents even though the 
vast majority pass the means test and enjoy the benefits of immediate discharge. 
 
In Australia and New Zealand personal insolvency legislation has remained 
largely unchanged for decades, apart from the limited addition of some alternatives to 
bankruptcy and the removal of early discharge in Australia. The legislation and 
processes associated with bankruptcy in both jurisdictions remains almost the same 
since the late nineteen sixties. This is despite new legislation being enacted (which 
covered the alternatives to bankruptcy but made little reform to bankruptcy itself).  
 
As such the Australasian model has had no real development in respect to 
gateways apart from the shepherding options prior to bankruptcy. However it should 
be noted that New Zealand and Australia have both seen a broadening in corporate 
insolvency alternatives over this same time frame, with both jurisdictions containing 
voluntary administration options for corporate insolvents. 
 
The summation of international trends still appears to be strongly towards a 
liberalisation of insolvency regimes. This liberalisation is being achieved through the 
removal of barriers to entry into such schemes with the widening of gateways. While 
the US Bankruptcy Code has bucked the trend it still does provide a mechanism for 
relief notwithstanding the additional gateway requirements.  
 
 
                                                 
170 Kilborn, above n 160 at 3. 
171 At 3. 
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G Gateways and Stakeholders 
 
Gateways provide an interesting benefit to all stakeholders. It is at a gateway 
where all of the interests of all stakeholders collide. By restricting entry to or 
discharge from a bankruptcy or an insolvency alternative by use of a gateway the 
interests of all parties get to be aired. Further shepherding insolvency cases down 
different paths based on some general fact criteria does create the potential for 
creditors to benefit from a dividend even if it is only a small one. 
 
The balancing act for the legislature has to be between the prevention of abuse 
and the easy flow of an efficient system. Too many cumbersome requirements add 
compliance costs on all parties and limits access to financial relief. Too few 
restrictions open the system up to abuse or the perception of abuse amongst 
competing stakeholders. The correct solution to these competing interests will vary 
from state to state depending on the cultural norms and expectations of each state. 
 
H Conclusion 
 
Gateways exist as common place across all jurisdictions in relation to 
insolvency and bankruptcy regimes. In some cases gateways are overt and in others 
they are more subtle. The key point is that gateways allow and control the flow of 
insolvency and bankruptcy cases through their respective jurisdictions. More efficient 
regimes offer less gateways with gate keepers that conform to the trust and cultural 
norms of the jurisdiction in question. Less efficient regimes add layers of bureaucracy 
and compliance criteria onto the regime in the hope of preventing abuse, which occurs 
only in the minority of circumstances. Ultimately if the gate keeper is trusted the 
regime is trusted. 
 
For the purposes of recommending reform the open gateways of Continental 
Europe have considerable appeal. Allowing easy access and diverting procedural 
processes away from the courts these gateways appear to be making insolvency relief 
more accessible. The freedom of flow in these jurisdictions does not appear to be 
opening a floodgate of abuse. 
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VII Insolvency Solutions for New Zealand 
 
A Introduction 
 
Over the proceeding chapters the current New Zealand system and those of 
other western jurisdictions have been examined. The overall summary of all the 
studied material is that that there exists a wide variety of ways of dealing with 
personal and consumer insolvency and bankruptcy. It is this variety that creates 
efficiencies or inefficiencies all within the one jurisdiction. The key point to be drawn 
from this is that each insolvency situation is unique and therefore a variety of 
mechanisms for managing them lubricates the overall insolvency system.  
 
It is clearly completely impractical to have an unlimited number of 
alternatives within an insolvency regime. However a small number of flexible 
alternatives does appear to be the best form for an insolvency regime to take.  
 
The current alternatives to bankruptcy of the No Asset Procedure and the 
Summary Instalment Order have a place within these proposed reforms. The benefit 
of these alternatives in the current system will be demonstrated through the statistical 
uptake of these insolvency options.  
 
Insolvency has an enormous effect on the insolvent and their creditors. 
Therefore decisions relating to which insolvency alternative should be utilised should 
not be rushed into. Nor should an insolvent be driven to bankruptcy if there are viable 
alternatives. Therefore the first of the proposed amendments to the Insolvency Act is 
to adopt a holding system whereby an insolvent can call a brief timeout so as to assess 
their alternatives. This brief reprieve will be based on the Australian model. Critics 
will argue that such a system will be only delaying the inevitable however it fills an 
important gap that exists in the current system. 
 
One of the major focuses of this thesis is the development of a single 
assessment gateway for insolvents. On entering through the gateway individuals will 
become personally insolvent. From there they will be assessed by the Official 
Assignee before proceeding down one of the prescribed alternatives. The key 
component of this is an assessment on the filing of a statement of affairs (debtor 
petition) or on the court’s referral (creditor petition). This gateway step will become a 
compulsory precursor to bankruptcy. All insolvents under this system will be required 
to file with the Trustee a complete statement of affairs prior to any further action 
occurring. If the information provided raises further questions for the trustee an 
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investigation can be undertaken by the trustee before proceeding to one of the three 
proposed outcomes. 
 
The first proposed outcome is the second major focus of this thesis, being 
personal administration. This would be an alternative to bankruptcy that would 
require a level of creditor approval. The general aim of this alternative is to allow the 
insolvent to contribute other assets or income streams into their insolvency that would 
not otherwise be available to creditors, thereby giving the creditors a better return and 
incentivising the insolvent to optimise their productivity as they stand to be better off 
if they do. 
 
For insolvents who are unable or unwilling to proceed with a personal 
administration program bankruptcy is still an alternative. It is proposed there be two 
bankruptcy options, with both being liquidated bankruptcies meaning that all the 
insolvent’s assets are realised by the trustee for the benefit of creditors. The first 
bankruptcy option allows for immediate discharge. This option would be only 
available to first time bankrupts and would only be used in situations where the cost 
of administration would outweigh any potential dividend. The second form of 
liquidated bankruptcy would be along the lines of the current traditional bankruptcy 
model and would last for three years. Both of these liquidated bankruptcy alternatives 
will be discussed in more detail. 
 
The need for there to be further amendments to the New Zealand insolvency 
regime are argued as being a direct result of the 2006 reforms not proceeding as far as 
the Ministry of Economic Development recommendations.172 Those recommendations 
included many ideas and concepts that have been developed in this chapter. Concepts 
such as suspension of proceedings, debtor and creditor education, incentives for early 
intervention and early discharge all form the basis of the proposed amendments. 
 
B Suspension of Proceedings 
 
As a generalisation one of the biggest issues with insolvents is denial or at 
least a lack by the insolvent being proactive in trying to reach an alternative to 
bankruptcy. This may be because they feel bankruptcy is inevitable. Or it could be 
that they do not realize alternatives exist that may be able to resolve their situation. 
Where creditors have exercised their legal rights to enforce a debt or obligation then 
the insolvent is also under time pressure as well as the financial pressure. Under such 
                                                 
172 Ministry of Economic Development Insolvency Law Review: Tier One Discussion Documents 
(Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2001). 
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emotional strain it is possible for insolvents to lack the clarity of vision required to 
fully assess their options. 
 
By its very nature a suspension of proceedings, under the proposed 
amendment, can only occur if a creditor has issued proceedings in Court. As a general 
proposition it will be assumed that most insolvents do not have a clear understanding 
of the processes surrounding insolvency and bankruptcy. The Court should therefore 
be obliged to offer the suspension of proceedings to all insolvents that appear before 
the Court. The merits of the bankruptcy notice173 or other court proceedings are 
irrelevant. The debtor has the option of suspension provided they agree to attend a 
meeting with the trustee. The purpose of this meeting is to provide advice on the 
alternatives for the insolvent. There would be strict timeframes involved with any 
suspension of proceedings, as per the Australian model the suspension could last for a 
maximum of 21 days. Once the insolvent had received advice and the suspension had 
expired they would return to Court for the matter to resume. 
 
As in the Australian model this suspension is not designed to circumvent the 
contractual rights of secured lenders from exercising their right to enforce their 
securities. This suspension should be distinguished from the asset freezes offered 
under the US Bankruptcy Code. Instead this suspension is designed to provide the 
insolvent with education, advice and thinking space so they are aware of their options 
prior to formally entering into an insolvency procedure. There is potential for an 
insolvent to dispose of assets over this period which could lead to creditors being 
deprived of an asset that would otherwise form part of the insolvent’s estate. This 
exact scenario was discussed at length at the Creditor’s Remedies Conference of 
2001. At this point the discussion related to moving the effective start date of 
bankruptcy from the “act of bankruptcy” to the point of adjudication. It was 
eventually decided that the rules associated with voidable transactions were strong 
enough to provide adequate creditor protection.174 While this situation cannot be 
directly controlled if an insolvent choses to act in a dishonest manner it can be 
tempered by the use of the voidable transactions provisions already contained in the 
legislation175. In order to add further protection to creditors, when a suspension is 
granted the Court would also make the insolvent aware that if they tried to use the 
extension to dispose of assets they would be deemed to have acted in bad faith and 
would not be eligible for immediate discharge as discussed below. With these creditor 
protections in place the position of all stakeholders is relatively protected. There are 
                                                 
173 Insolvency Act 2006, ss 16 – 29. 
174 Fleur Baker and Ralph Simpson Creditors’ Remedies (Continuing Education Department of the 
New Zealand Law Society July 2001) 145. 
175 Insolvency Act 2006, section 194-216, covering insolvent transactions, insolvent charges, insolvent 
gifts, irregular transactions, under value transactions and contributions to other people’s property.  
61 
 
some unique situations where stakeholders cannot be protected with a suspension, 
these are situations where the insolvent’s estate consists of items that are perishable 
and the suspension causes a delay which would see such items expire. Overall 
however a suspension facility provides for a protected environment which allows 
better decisions to be made by insolvents without compromising the stakeholder’s 
positions. 
  
Whilst the office of the Official Assignee currently is more than happy to meet 
with individuals who are facing financial troubles, very few people avail themselves 
of this option. At present an insolvent who is facing creditor petition in court can 
request a delay in proceedings, which is granted at the discretion of the Court. While 
this can allow the insolvent more time, there is no compulsion on them to seek further 
advice, education or explore alternatives.   It is suggested that by encouraging a 
meeting early in court proceedings efficiencies will be created further in the system. 
 
C Alternatives to Bankruptcy 
 
New Zealand’s existing alternatives to bankruptcy fit a range of special 
situations that provide all parties a range of options. There are situations where the 
size and nature of the debt is relatively small but the ability to repay as per the 
contracted terms is nevertheless not possible, or there are situations where creditors 
are in agreement with a proposal presented by an insolvent. In these situations it 
makes sense that any amendments to the New Zealand legislation continue to 
incorporate these existing features. As such the existing systems of Part 5 
Proposals176, Summary Instalment Orders177 and No Asset Procedures178 would all be 
maintained in any new model. It is conceded that there will be some overlap between 
these existing options and the proposed amendments.  
 
When the Ministry of Economic Development made recommendations for 
reform of the 1967 Insolvency Act179 it suggested that bankrupts who were not guilty 
of any misconduct should be discharged after one year. It was from this broad 
recommendation that the No Asset Procedure system was developed. Essentially the 
No Asset Procedure is a mini bankruptcy which is administrated by the Official 
Assignee rather than the courts. It is limited by the level of debt that is allowable 
under the regime. Currently it requires the insolvent to owe between $1,000 and 
$40,000. If there was an alternative of a liquidated bankruptcy with immediate 
                                                 
176 Insolvency Act 2006 s 326. 
177 Insolvency Act 2006 s340. 
178 Insolvency Act 2006 s361. 
179 Ministry of Economic Development, above n 172 at 47. 
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discharge, that solution could compete directly with the No Asset Procedures where 
debt levels were in the same band. 
 
It is suggested that an easy access option that does not require the gateway of 
personal insolvency (see below) provides a benefit. This coupled with the No Asset 
Procedure not incurring the same stigma as bankruptcy means that the two can co-
exist despite the overlap. Likewise Proposals and Summary Instalment Orders can 
exist in tandem with personal administration. The thrust of this thesis is to provide 
multiple options to insolvents when considering entering into an insolvency regime. 
More options should yield better outcomes for stakeholders, especially with the new 
oversight powers being granted to the office of the Official Assignee.  
 
 
D The Gateway into Personal Insolvency 
 
The concept of gateways in insolvency procedures is not new as discussed in 
previous chapters. The issue with gateways is the balancing between having an entry 
criteria and managing flow without either limiting access to relief or opening up 
floodgates where abuse is a perceived issue. Jason Kilborn180 in his many works has 
raised considerable concern about using gateways to protect against perceived abuse 
of insolvency relief. The statistics that he relies on indicate that the vast majority of 
insolvencies across varying jurisdictions are void of debtor fraud. The underlying 
theme of his work is that systems which involve less restrictions and lubrication of 
process are the most efficient. This thesis supports the view of Kilborn, in that 
processes should be simple and access to relief should be straightforward. However 
there still needs to be a system that has integrity and can be relied upon by all 
stakeholders.  
 
The first gateway proposed and discussed in this chapter is not a gateway to 
bankruptcy. Instead it is a gateway into an insolvency regime. For the purpose of this 
paper it will be referred to as the insolvency gateway. The regime which it controls 
access to shall, also for the purpose of this thesis, be referred to as personal 
insolvency. This chapter will outline a proposed method of personal insolvency and 
the options that can flow from it which are: traditional liquidated bankruptcy, a 
proposal for personal administration or liquidated bankruptcy with immediate 
discharge. Once personal insolvency has been entered into there is a second gateway 
that performs a shepherding function to which will be referred to as the shepherding 
gateway. The shepherding gateway shepherds insolvents to one of the three options 
mentioned above.  
                                                 
180 Kilborn, above n 160. 
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E Proposed Wording of Statute for Entry into Personal Insolvency 
 
For debtor petition the current section 47 would be replaced with the following 
wording: 
 
Debtor automatically adjudicated personally insolvent 
(1) A debtor who files an application with the Assignee to have 
himself or herself adjudicated bankrupt is automatically adjudicated 
personally insolvent when the application is filed. 
(2) That adjudication has the same consequences as if the debtor had 
been adjudicated personally insolvent by the court. 
 
For creditor petition to the High Court the current section 55 would be 
replaced with the following wording: 
 
Personal Insolvency commences on adjudication 
Personal Insolvency commences on the date and at the time when a 
debtor fails to comply with a Bankruptcy Notice as contained in Section 
17 of this Act. 
 
The actual acts of bankruptcy referred to in section 17 would not change and 
would remain as being181: 
 
17 Failure to comply with bankruptcy notice 
(1) A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if— 
(a) a creditor has obtained a final judgment or a final order 
against the debtor for any amount; and 
(b) execution of the judgment or order has not been halted 
by a court; and 
(c) the debtor has been served with a bankruptcy notice; 
and 
(d) the debtor has not, within the time limit specified in 
subsection (4),— 
(i) complied with the requirements of the notice; or 
(ii)  satisfied the court that he or she has a cross 
claim against the creditor. 
(2) The form that the bankruptcy notice must take is set out in 
section 29. 
(3) The debtor must have been served with the bankruptcy notice 
in New Zealand, unless the court gave permission for the service of 
the notice on the debtor outside New Zealand. 
                                                 
181 Insolvency Act 2006, s 17. 
64 
 
(4) The time limit referred to in subsection (1)(d) is,— 
(a) if the debtor is served with the bankruptcy notice in 
New Zealand, 10 working days after service; or 
(b) if the debtor is served outside New Zealand, the time 
specified in the order of the court permitting service 
outside New Zealand. 
(5) In this section, a creditor who has obtained a final judgment or 
a final order includes a person who is for the time being entitled to 
enforce a final judgment or final order. 
(6) In this section, if a court has given permission for enforcing an 
arbitration award that the debtor pay money to the creditor,— 
(a) final order includes the arbitration award; and 
(b) proceedings includes the arbitration proceedings in 
which the award was made. 
(7) In subsection (1)(d)(ii), cross claim means a counterclaim, set-
off, or cross demand that— 
(a) is equal to, or greater than, the judgment debt or the 
amount that the debtor has been ordered to pay; and 
(b) the debtor could not use as a defence in the action or 
proceedings in which the judgment or the order, as the case 
may be, was obtained. 
 
 
Section 10 of the existing Act relating to adjudication would also have to be 
amended as bankruptcy could now only be entered into by order of the Official 
Assignee or the Court. Such an order could only be made after the insolvent had been 
in personal insolvency and the Official Assignee had examined them. This 
amendment does deny debtors from entering directly into bankruptcy through debtor 
petition. However this is offset against the argued benefit that personal insolvency and 
Official Assignee examination could result in a better form of relief than traditional 
bankruptcy. 
 
 
F Ease of Entry 
 
New Zealand has historically enjoyed an insolvency regime that is easy to 
enter. That feature must be retained in any reform. The 2006 Act and its 1967 
predecessor both featured entry either by debtor petition or creditor petition. Where a 
debtor filed, there was and is no filing fee and no obligation to contribute to the cost 
of any administration of the bankrupt estate should there be no realisable assets. It is 
this ease of entry that must be retained through personal insolvency not requiring any 
fee for filing and no further fee being required for any of the alternatives of the 
shepherding gateway. The German Insolvenzordnung removed the upfront cost of 
administration with effect in 2002. This saw the number of filed insolvencies triple 
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from 15,000 to about 45,000182 that year. It is therefore paramount to retain the no 
cost entry to the regime so that no barrier to entry exists. 
 
Creditor petition is through the courts. The insolvent does not have to incur the 
direct cost of this procedure, unless they engage representation for the proceedings. 
The costs incurred by the petitioning creditor become a priority debt for the bankrupt 
estate. The downside of this system is that a practically unrecoverable cost burden is 
placed on a creditor. As such many creditors elect not to pursue debts to bankruptcy 
of the debtor because they stand to lose these legal fees as well. 
 
It is therefore proposed that the gateway for creditor petition be moved from 
an adjudication by the court to the point where an act of bankruptcy has been 
committed by virtue of the expiry of a bankruptcy notice. By moving the gateway to 
this point the creditor is able to avoid the additional court costs of an appearance in 
court and achieve a result at a lower cost point. The insolvent is not disadvantaged, 
the bankruptcy notice has been filed in the court and the insolvent has been served183. 
The notice in its current format as defined in Form B2184 clearly outlines the 
insolvent’s options. If the insolvent does not comply with the options then on the 
expiry of the notice they will pass through the gateway. Under the current law the 
expiration of a bankruptcy notice equates to an act of bankruptcy. Once an individual 
has performed an act of bankruptcy under the current legislation the creditor can 
apply to the court for an adjudication.  
 
The practical application of this amendment is explained by way of an 
example of a creditor pursuing a debtor to personal insolvency. A debtor who has 
failed to pay a judgement creditor and has also failed to lodge a valid counter claim 
could be served with a Bankruptcy Notice, in the same manner and prescribed format 
as exists under the current legislation. For the creditor to issue such a notice they incur 
a modest filing fee and the court processes the bankruptcy notice on the papers, with 
there being no need for a hearing. Once the debtor has been correctly served with the 
notice the creditor needs to take no further enforcement action. If the debtor fails to 
make payment as per the bankruptcy notice prior to that notice expiring or complying 
with any other requirement contained within that notice, then an act of bankruptcy has 
been performed. On performance of an act of bankruptcy the debtor would 
immediately pass into personal insolvency and their assets vested with the Official 
Assignee. The insolvent debtor now would have to file a statement of affairs with the 
                                                 
182 Kilborn, above n 160 at 23. 
183 Insolvency Act 2006, s 17(4)(a). 
184 Insolvency Act 2006, Schedule 1. 
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Official Assignee and have their affairs examined before an insolvency alternative 
could be decided upon.   
 
Conversely if a debtor wanted to file their own application as per section 46 
and the amended section 47 mentioned above they could do so. In completing a 
statement of affairs document and filing it with the office of the Official Assignee the 
individual would pass into personal insolvency and their affairs would be scrutinised 
by the Official Assignee. It is hoped as an incentive to encourage debtors to take 
action sooner that such an application, if it met the general criteria discussed below, 
could lead to immediate discharge. Under the current legislation an individual who 
files a debtor’s petition is adjudicated bankrupt. By adding in the step of personal 
insolvency and its associated scrutiny from the Official Assignee it is intended that 
insolvents can be progressed through the system faster, especially in cases where 
immediate discharge or personal insolvency are alternatives. 
 
This now creates a side issue. Historically there are a number of instances 
where bankruptcy notices have been found by the courts to be deficient. If the 
gateway is passed through at the expiration of the bankruptcy notice then there must 
be a system for checking the notice prior to its expiration. Current grounds where 
bankruptcy notices have been considered defective are identified by Street Legal as 
follows:185  
1. Has the bankruptcy notice been served within 1 month of the 
date on which it was issued by the High Court? If the bankruptcy 
notice is renewed then it must be served within 1 month from the 
expiry of the initial period, or from the expiry of the last period of 
renewal and not from the date of the order of renewal. 
2. Was the bankruptcy notice personally served in accordance with 
rules 6.1 and 6.8 of the High Court Rules, or was there an order for 
substituted service? 
3. Does the bankruptcy notice state the amount of any costs claimed 
against you; 
4. Does the bankruptcy notice include a full address for payment of 
the debt. In Re Matheson, ex parte Watson [1972] NZLR 1084 the 
address for payment specified in the notice was “Auckland”. The 
Court considered that insufficient and the defect was not cured just 
because an address for service was contained in the bankruptcy 
notice. 
5. Does the bankruptcy notice include the full name and address of 
the judgment creditor or the full name and address for service of the 
solicitor of the judgment creditor – Re McIntyre [1955] NZLR 7; Re 
Trueman ex parte Western-Webb and Co [1959] NZLR 737. 
6. Does the bankruptcy notice state all prescribed methods of 
satisfying the notice. A failure to include any of the contents of 
                                                 
185 Street Legal, “Introduction to Bankruptcy Notices” <http://www.legalstreet.co.nz/bankruptcy.html>. 
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paragraph 1 of the notice in Form B2 can make the notice defective. 
In Re Boddie, ex parte Amburys Ltd [1933] NZLR 1012 the words 
“or the satisfaction of the Court” were left out. The Court held that 
the bankruptcy notice was defective and dismissed the petition. 
7. Does the bankruptcy notice purport to be issued in respect to 
more than one judgment – Re Low [1891] 1 QB 148; Carlyle v 
McCardle Richardson (HC, Wellington B 394/96, 12 March 1997, 
Master Thomson) 
Despite the above, a Court may still order that a defective Bankruptcy 
Notice not be set aside pursuant to Section 418 of the Insolvency Act 
2006. However this order may not be made if the debtor is prejudiced by 
the defect. 
 
The issues surrounding the deficiencies in potential bankruptcy notices will 
create litigation regardless, whether they are the entry point to the insolvency regime 
or not. It is argued that any additional litigation created by moving the gateway to the 
expiry of such a notice is outweighed by the reduction in the Court’s time in hearing 
bankruptcy applications and associated proceedings. If an insolvent is issued with a 
bankruptcy notice which they believe to be deficient they will retain their right of 
recourse to the court to have the validity of the notice ruled upon. The practical reality 
of such an examination of the notice if found deficient will only result in a new notice 
being issued which does not contain the deficiency. Such an argument may only result 
in achieving little more than a delay in the process. 
 
By moving the gateway to personal insolvency to the point at which the 
bankruptcy notice expires, a new incentive is created for debtors who wish to file a 
proposal under Part 5 of the Insolvency Act to do so earlier. Situations like the one 
that arose in Henderson186 where the Court is hearing both a proposal and an 
application for adjudication would no longer occur. Instead if the bankruptcy notice 
had expired the Official Assignee would examine the insolvent and there would be no 
need for a hearing. The insolvent is therefore incentivised to place a proposal before 
the court well before a creditor takes steps to issue a bankruptcy notice.  
 
It is important to note, that the option discussed earlier to suspend proceedings 
would now apply to suspending the bankruptcy notice for the prescribed timeframe. 
Such a suspension of the bankruptcy notice would require a brief amendment to the 
Insolvency Act 2006 s17. The point being that the insolvent is given the opportunity 
to engage with the Official Assignee and understand their options prior to the 
bankruptcy notice expiring. This means that the debtor who qualifies for one of the 
alternatives such as the No Asset Procedure can enter that program prior to the 
expiration of the bankruptcy notice. 
                                                 
186 Henderson, ex parte Commissioner for Inland Revenue (2011) 25 NZTC 20-049. 
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If a consumer debtor defaulted on their obligations and a bankruptcy notice 
was served on them, the debtor could apply for a suspension of the bankruptcy notice 
so they could learn more about their alternatives. The office of the Official Assignee 
would have a legislated monopoly on the provision of further information in these 
circumstances. This system creates consistency and reliability of information being 
provided to insolvents.   
 
 
 
 
G The Second Gateway 
 
The second gateway is the shepherding gateway and only applies to insolvents 
who are already in personal insolvency by virtue of having passed through the 
insolvency gateway by one of the two prescribed methods. Those methods being 
expiration of a bankruptcy notice and debtor petition. The outcomes for insolvents 
who present at the shepherding gateway will be heavily dictated by their statement of 
affairs and by what outcome the insolvent is wanting to achieve. If the insolvent does 
not wish to attempt financial rehabilitation through personal administration then only 
the two liquidated bankruptcy alternatives are available to them.  
 
The statement of affairs is a prescribed form that all personal insolvents are 
required to complete whether they entered the program through debtor petition or the 
expiration of a bankruptcy notice.  After the Official Assignee has examined the form 
they can determine if the insolvent should be granted an immediate discharge or 
whether they should remain undischarged for three years, or longer if court orders are 
sought. These alternative forms of bankruptcy and associated discharge procedures 
are further discussed later in the chapter. The important point to note is that there is a 
second gateway that determines the insolvency’s administrative outcome. 
 
 
 
H Stakeholders 
 
The cost of creditor petition is reduced, the creditor only would have to pay 
for the issuing and service of a bankruptcy notice, rather than incurring the costs 
associated with a full hearing as is the current situation. Such amendments will make 
New Zealand’s insolvency regime the most open and accessible for all parties. The 
costs for creditors of entry into personal insolvency by creditor petition have been 
reduced and a fair balance has been achieved. Debtors, if they wish can enter the 
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scheme with no personal financial outlay. Under this proposed model creditors can 
now enjoy the same low cost access to the system. Further by truncating the process 
the insolvent’s affairs are examined earlier than they may otherwise have been. This 
achieves the double benefit of offering the insolvent earlier relief and reducing the 
opportunity for the insolvent to create further indebtedness.  
 
The insolvent also benefits from the ability to seek a suspension of 
proceedings so as to get advice and information which they may not have been aware 
of under the existing model. If the insolvent is informed about the alternatives it may 
result in them immediately filing for a debtor’s petition rather than waiting for the 
expiration of a bankruptcy notice.  
 
By bypassing the court to achieve a state of personal insolvency, stakeholders 
get direct access to the regime. This frees up the court to hear only substantive matters 
and technical arguments rather than the court being a processing centre. Regular 
applicants to the court such as the Commissioner for Inland Revenue save 
considerable time and expense in dealing with applications which are seldom 
defended. Those applicants that dispute the debt still have the right to make an 
application to the court to set aside the bankruptcy notice and will be successful if 
they have valid grounds for doing so.  
 
The Official Assignee is a government official. The model of personal 
insolvency only works in a robust manner if the public and the courts have confidence 
in the office of the Official Assignee. The proposed amendment of utilising the office 
of the Official Assignee creates a potential risk for differing offices to implement the 
proposed changes differently. Such examples of a regional variation have been seen in 
other jurisdictions where a regional trustee is given considerable discretion under the 
legislation.187 In order to avoid such variance the right to appeal any regional decision 
to the court must be retained. 
 
Although the process of personal administration differs from the current 
model, the function and role of the Official Assignee does not change. The Official 
Assignee is still responsible for the administration of the insolvent’s estate, and all 
property of the insolvent vests with the Official Assignee. The Official Assignee still 
retains the right to investigate the insolvent’s affairs and prosecute them if they find 
wrong doing. The only difference in the role of the Official Assignee relates to the 
first gateway where administration starts on the expiration of the bankruptcy notice 
rather than at adjudication. 
                                                 
187 Jason Kilborn, “Twenty-Five Years of Consumer Bankruptcy in Continental Europe: Internalizing 
Negative Externalities and Humanizing Justice in Denmark” (2009) 18 Insol. Rev. 155 at 174. 
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By having a single entry gateway to personal insolvency that can only be 
passed by two very distinct actions, debtor petition or expiration of a bankruptcy 
notice; creates certainty for the system. The proposed system of personal insolvency 
must be deemed to be efficient by the criteria set out by Kilborn188 in assessing 
European jurisdictions, in that there is no barrier to entry into the scheme, no upfront 
financial cost and no delay. Under personal insolvency creditors start to enjoy the 
same efficiencies as insolvents in enforcing their respective rights and access to relief. 
 
I Liquidated Bankruptcy with Discharge 
 
It is accepted that there are many aspects to liquidated bankruptcies. This 
thesis choses to only focus on discharge as a comparative reference to the suggested 
model of personal administration. By further examining discharge and providing 
discharge alternatives it is argued that the overall insolvency regime becomes more 
robust by having more viable alternatives. 
 
Once an insolvent has entered into personal insolvency there can only be three 
different outcomes. These outcomes are a liquidated bankruptcy with immediate 
discharge, a liquidated bankruptcy with a traditional discharge (the current model) or 
personal administration. This section deals with liquidated bankruptcy and the two 
approaches to discharge. Penney notes:189 
 
The discharge of bankrupts is a vital part of the bankruptcy regime. In 
exchange for giving up their assets, complying with the restrictions 
placed on them by the Insolvency Act and co-operating with the Official 
Assignee (OA) the bankrupt is released from those debts that formed the 
bankruptcy. Once freed from the burden of crippling debts the bankrupt 
can once again make a positive contribution to society.  
 
Discharge represents the final stage of the bankruptcy process. It is where the 
bankrupt moves from being under the control of the Official Assignee with the 
restrictions placed on them by the Insolvency Act to a normal legal status. As this 
transition takes place the bankrupt ceases making any financial contributions to 
creditors that may have been ordered. They are also free to avail themselves of credit 
facilities if they so wish. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 Kilborn, above n 160 at 1. 
189 Penney, above n 27 at 1.. 
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J Objections to Discharge 
 
Most of the activity surrounding bankruptcy occurs on entry into the regime. 
This is where the bankrupt is assigned a new IRD number and their debts are moved 
to their bankrupt estate. On discharge bankrupts cease to be liable for their debts and 
the clean slate is given subject to a few criteria as set out in section 304 which 
states:190 
 
304 Debts from which bankrupt is released on discharge 
(1) On discharge, the bankrupt is released from all debts provable 
in the bankruptcy except those listed in subsection (2). 
(2) The bankrupt is not released from the following debts: 
(a) any debt or liability incurred by fraud or fraudulent 
breach of trust to which the bankrupt was a party: 
(b) any debt or liability for which the bankrupt has 
obtained forbearance through fraud to which the bankrupt 
was a party: 
(c) any judgment debt or amount payable under any order 
for which the bankrupt is liable under section 147 or 
section 298: 
(d) any amount payable under a maintenance order under 
the Family Proceedings Act 1980: 
(e) any amount payable under the Child Support Act 1991. 
 
Discharge represents a return to independence for the bankrupt. During the 
bankruptcy administration period the Official Assignee has overall responsibility for 
the bankrupt. If the Official Assignee determines that the conduct of a bankrupt either 
during or prior to bankruptcy was unacceptable they can apply to the Court to prolong 
the bankruptcy by denying the bankrupt a discharge. Section 290 of the Insolvency 
Act states:191 
 
290 Automatic discharge 3 years after bankrupt files statement of affairs 
(1) A bankrupt is automatically discharged from bankruptcy 3 years after 
the bankrupt files a statement of affairs under section 46 or section 67, but 
may apply to be discharged earlier. 
(2) However, a bankrupt is not automatically discharged if— 
(a) the Assignee or a creditor has objected under section 292 and 
the objection has not been withdrawn by the end of the 3-year 
period referred to in subsection (1); or 
(b) the bankrupt has to be publicly examined under section 173 and 
has not completed that examination; or 
(c) the bankrupt is undischarged from an earlier bankruptcy. 
 
 
                                                 
190 Insolvency Act 2006, s 304. 
191 Insolvency Act 2006, s 290. 
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Discharge as a matter of course occurs three years after the filing of the 
statement of affairs. This automatic discharge has the same effect as if it had been 
ordered by the Court.192 There is the ability for either a creditor or the Official 
Assignee to object to the automatic discharge under s292. If an objection is raised, the 
Court must examine the bankrupt. In order for the Court to have the appropriate 
evidence before it the Official Assignee has to file a report.193 This report must 
contain the following information:194 
 
(2) The Assignee must report as to— 
(a) the bankrupt's affairs; and 
(b) the causes of the bankruptcy; and 
(c) the bankrupt's performance of his or her duties under this Act; and 
(d) the manner in which the bankrupt has obeyed orders of the Court; and 
(e) the bankrupt's conduct before and after adjudication; and 
(f) any other matter that would assist the Court in making a decision as to 
the bankrupt's discharge. 
 
Once armed with this information the Court can make a determination on the 
appropriate order. The court can either grant or refuse discharge.195 The court can also 
order discharge with restrictions placed upon the bankrupt.196 The scope of the 
Court’s discretion has been tested in many historical cases, however in the case of 
ASB Bank v Hogg the Court of Appeal made the following directive statement:197 
 
In conferring a discretion expressed in the broadest terms, the legislation 
recognises that each case will be different, that the relevant factors may 
vary from case to case and that the exercise of the discretion must be 
governed by the circumstances of the particular case having regard to the 
guidance provided by a consideration of the scheme and purpose of the 
legislation. In providing for automatic discharge after three years, the 
legislation recognises that it is not in the public interest that the 
bankruptcy should endure indefinitely. In providing for earlier discharge, 
s 108 [see now 294 of the Insolvency Act 2006] recognises that 
continuing the bankruptcy to the end of the three years may not be in the 
public interest. Whether or not it is will be a matter for decision on the 
particular facts. In that regard, guidance is provided by s 109(2) [see now 
s 296 of the Insolvency Act 2006] which lists matters on which the 
assignee is to report to the High Court in such a case. The Court is to 
consider the assignee's report as to the affairs of the bankrupt, the causes 
of the bankruptcy, the manner in which the bankrupt has performed the 
duties imposed on him or her under the Act and his or her conduct both 
before and after the bankruptcy, and also any other fact, matter or 
circumstance that would assist the Court in making its decision. Clearly 
the Court apprised of the matter will consider the legitimate interests of 
                                                 
192 Section 291. 
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194 Section 296(1). 
195 Section 298. 
196 Section 299. 
197 ASB Bank v Hogg [1993] 3 NZLR 156 (CA). 
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the bankrupt, the creditors, and wider public concerns, but it is neither 
required nor entitled to impose threshold requirements in the exercise of 
the discretion so as to derogate from the breadth of the powers conferred 
under s 110 [see now s 298 of the Insolvency Act 2006]. The applicant 
has the onus, in the sense of adducing evidence, to show good cause for 
ordering an early discharge, but his obligation goes no further than that. 
 
While this statement did not contain any new material it did encapsulate all of 
the previous principles in one concise passage. This passage has now become a 
reference point quoted as precedent in subsequent cases. When Mr Armitage was 
brought before the court because of the Official Assignee’s objection to his third 
discharge from bankruptcy, the court further focused on the issues as summarised by 
Brookers:198 
 
(i) The onus is on the Assignee to satisfy the Court that it is in the 
public interest that the bankruptcy should continue for a further 
period. 
(ii) The Court has a broad discretion which it must have regard to all 
the circumstances of the particular case. 
(iii) In the absence of good reasons, a bankrupt should 
normally obtain a discharge. However, public interest factors 
may mean that an order of discharge should be refused. 
(iv) Guidance in the exercise of the Courts discretion is 
provided by s 296(2), which lists matters on which the Assignee 
is to report to the High Court. Thus, the Court may consider the 
manner in which the bankrupt has performed the duties imposed 
on him or her under the Act and his or her conduct both before 
and after the bankruptcy and any other matters that may assist 
the Court in making its decision. 
(v) The relevant matters therefore include: the interests of the 
bankrupt; the interests of the creditors; the public interest; 
commercial morality and the conduct of the bankrupt. 
 
The points summarised above at (v) above provides a concise list of 
stakeholders. It is quite clear that the competing interests of stakeholders has to be the 
key determinate of the court when deciding whether to extend the period of 
bankruptcy rather than granting discharge. Weighing up the various factors including 
the conduct of the individuals involved will be of paramount importance. In Edwards 
v Official Assignee199 the court based its decision on not granting a discharge based on 
the conduct of Mr Edwards. Mr Edwards’ conduct had been so abhorrent that he was 
serving a custodial sentence for the very events that had led to his bankruptcy. The 
                                                 
198 Commentary Insolvency Law & Practice, Brookers Online 
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/databases/modus/lawpart/statutes/ACT-NZL-PUB-
Y.2006-55~BDY~PT.4~SPT.1~SG.!101~S.298?si=57359 last viewed 26 February 2014. 
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court acknowledged that the duration of Mr Edwards bankruptcy would exceed seven 
years but was not satisfied that he did not pose a considerable commercial risk to the 
business community and the public. 
 
 
K Fresh Start, Can it Fail to Rehabilitate? 
 
The concept of the fresh start is that the insolvent is released from their 
financial burdens and is offered the opportunity to start over without those obligations 
acting as a millstone. It is important to note that there are some debts that a bankrupt 
is not released from on discharge in New Zealand. The most important debt that is not 
provable is Child Support. Although a bankrupt will be discharged from bankruptcy at 
the end of the prescribed period unprovable debts and obligations will remain in force 
and are unavoidable. 
 
The humanitarian theory200 is based on the concept of rehabilitation. However 
some of the issues which potentially led to the cause of the bankruptcy may not have 
been resolved simply because the individual has gone through bankruptcy and 
discharge process. Statistics from the US indicate that about two thirds of discharged 
bankrupts move on to being in an improved situation within twelve months of 
discharge. There does not appear to have been any studies on the equivalent in New 
Zealand. However the New Zealand Insolvency and Trustee Service does publish 
annual statistics relating to repeat bankruptcies. In the year ending 30 June 2013, 12% 
of the 2188 bankruptcies were repeat bankrupts. From these numbers it is reasonable 
to assume that there exists an equivalent section of the population in New Zealand 
that are struggling but have just not re-entered bankruptcy.  The concern is obviously 
the third of discharged bankrupts identified in the US statistics, who feel their 
financial situation was the same as or worse than when they were bankrupt. Porter and 
Thorne surmise:201  
 
These data highlight a critical reality about the bankruptcy system and 
should give pause to those who bemoan the generosity of Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. The most fundamental assumption of consumer bankruptcy 
– that the fresh start results in a productive end – is suspect. Life after 
bankruptcy is not unequivocally better for many families. These findings 
are a powerful reminder of the limitations of the consumer bankruptcy 
system. 
 
An insolvency regime’s powers of rehabilitation are clearly limited especially 
where other socio economic factors are present. An individual’s poor health, failure to 
                                                 
200 Gross, above n 4 at 131. 
201 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, “The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start” (2006) 92 Cornell 
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maintain regular employment, addictions, gambling or inability to live within a 
budget are all factors that undermine the potential positive outcomes post-bankruptcy 
discharge. However the two thirds majority still achieve a better outcome after 
discharge. Discharge with a clean slate must therefore be viewed as a success as the 
majority are able to escape from the debt cycle.  
 
Regardless of what models are suggested for an insolvency regime, it is 
acknowledged that there will still be individuals who, for a variety of complicating 
factors will not escape the insolvency cycle through a clean slate discharge or 
equivalent mechanism.   
 
L Immediate Discharge 
 
The concept of an immediate discharge is not new. Chapter 7 in the US has 
been around since 1978 as part of the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 7 in its purest form 
allows insolvents a fresh start. Chapter 7 allows for a liquidated bankruptcy. In a 
liquidated bankruptcy scenario the trustee is responsible for the collection and 
realisation of assets and distribution of any dividends to creditors. An insolvent who 
wishes to file a bankruptcy under Chapter 7 does not have to file a plan as to creditor 
repayment. 
 
In order to be eligible for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy an insolvent must pass a 
means test. The means test is designed to pick up cases of abuse, where an insolvent is 
filing merely to escape their legitimate obligations without having to make any form 
of ongoing contribution. If the insolvent has a “current monthly income” more than 
the state median the Chapter 7 filing is presumptively abusive. Abuse is presumed if 
the debtor’s aggregate current monthly income over 5 years, net of certain statutory 
allowed expenses, is more than (1) $11,725, or (ii) 25% of the debtor’s non-priority 
unsecured debt, as long as that amount is at least $7,025202. (2) The debtor may rebut 
a presumption of abuse only by a showing of special circumstances that justify 
additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income. Unless the debtor 
overcomes the presumption of abuse, the case will generally be converted to Chapter 
13 (with the debtors consent) or will be dismissed. 11 U.S.C. s707(b)(1).203 
 
If a debtor meets the requirements for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy the trustee must 
within 21 and 40 days hold a meeting of creditors. The insolvent is placed on oath and 
is subject to questioning from the trustee and or creditors. The trust then will report to 
                                                 
202 11 U.S.C. §707(b)(2). 
203 United States Courts, “Liquidation Under Bankruptcy Code” 
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the court within 10 days on whether the case is presumptively abuse under the means 
test.204 
 
Whilst the principal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is that there is immediate 
discharge this is not the case. The bankrupt is not discharged until after the creditors 
meeting and the court has had the opportunity to evaluate the case. This usually 
occurs some 60 to 90 days after the creditor’s first meeting.205 
 
In proposing an immediate discharge model for New Zealand some context 
needs to be expanded upon. The insolvent under the proposed model would have 
already been in a state of personal insolvency for a month or so at this point, as per 
the model described above. The Official Assignee has already ascertained the 
insolvent’s full financial position and has determined the likelihood of any dividend 
being available for distribution. If with all of this knowledge the Official Assignee 
determines that the ongoing cost of administering the bankrupt estate will outweigh 
any potential recovery, the insolvent has fully cooperated with the process, there 
exists no question of dishonesty on the part of the insolvent and this is the insolvent’s 
first time utilising an insolvency remedy then they qualify for immediate discharge. 
 
In the interests of optimising the time of the court and to maximise the 
efficiency of the system it is suggested that the power to administrate the system and 
grant the discharge should rest with the Official Assignee. The only time the court 
would need to be involved would be in the rare circumstance where a creditor 
objected to an immediate discharge. By virtue of the Official Assignee already 
conducting a thorough examination of the insolvent while in personal administration 
they were able to report accurately to creditors prior to immediate discharge. If a 
creditor was dissatisfied with the situation the Official Assignee already had the report 
to file with the court. 
 
 
M Support for Immediate Discharge 
 
International models such as the US Chapter 7 (although the process has been 
complicated by BACPA), Australia between 1991 and 2002, and France all have 
utilised models of immediate discharge. New Zealand through the reports and 
recommendations of the Ministry of Economic Development suggested amending the 
current model to include a discharge after one year for bankrupts who were not guilty 
of commercial misconduct.206 This coupled with actual solutions like the No Asset 
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Procedure which was enacted by the legislature, confirm that New Zealand is ready 
for a system that allows for immediate discharge with the following caveats and or 
circumstances: 
 
1. That the insolvent has never utilised an insolvency regime previously; and 
2. That the insolvent has undergone examination by the Official Assignee under 
personal administration and the Official Assignee thought the bankrupt was a 
suitable candidate for early discharge; and 
3. That the cost of administration of the bankrupt estate would be greater than 
any potential recovery. 
The key component would be that such an early discharge would be at the 
discretion of the Official Assignee. There would however be a presumption that early 
discharge would occur if a creditor met the three general criteria set out above, while 
it is envisaged that immediate discharge will release the bankrupt from bankruptcy 
and allow them to start rehabilitation sooner. The existing obligations post discharge 
would still apply for the bankrupt to assist the Official Assignee or the court.207 
Further the public records associated with recording the bankruptcy on the Insolvency 
Register would also remain.208 
 
If a creditor was to object to immediate discharge they would still have the 
same rights as they do now to object to the court under section 292 which has been 
previously discussed. However the creditor would be holding that view in contrast to 
the Official Assignee who had already examined the creditor, although it is important 
that creditors have the right to object to the court. However there should be limits on 
which objections can be raised. It would be impractical if a creditor raised an 
objection just because they thought it was not fair or they wanted to get paid. The 
objection should instead go to the conduct and commercial morality of the bankrupt. 
It is suggested that by having an express list of grounds for refusing a discharge 
provides greater certainty for all stakeholders. In the US there is a specific list of 
grounds for refusing discharge209 and it is suggested that similar grounds be adopted 
in the amended New Zealand model. The suggested wording of this section is: 
 
The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—  
(1) the debtor is not an individual;  
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or the Official 
Assignee, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has 
permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed—  
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(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the 
petition; or  
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition;  
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or 
preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, 
from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be 
ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the 
circumstances of the case;  
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—  
(A) made a false oath or account;  
(B) presented or used a false claim;  
(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain money, property, or 
advantage, or a promise of money, property, or advantage, for acting or 
forbearing to act; or  
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession under this 
title, any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and 
papers, relating to the debtor’s property or financial affairs;  
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before determination of denial of 
discharge under this paragraph, any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the 
debtor’s liabilities;  
(6) the debtor has refused, in the case—  
(A) to obey any lawful order of the court or Official Assignee, other than an 
order to respond to a material question or to testify;  
(B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to a 
material question approved by the court or Official Assignee or to testify, 
after the debtor has been granted immunity with respect to the matter 
concerning which such privilege was invoked; or  
(C) on a ground other than the properly invoked privilege against self-
incrimination, to respond to a material question approved by the court or 
Official Assignee or to testify;  
(7) the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of 
this subsection, on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition.  
(b)  
(1) The Official Assignee or a creditor may object to the granting of a discharge 
under subsection (a) of this section.  
(c) On request of the Official Assignee or a creditor, and after notice and a hearing, 
the court shall revoke a discharge granted under subsection (a) of this section if—  
(1) such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the debtor, and the 
requesting party did not know of such fraud until after the granting of such 
discharge;  
(2) the debtor acquired property that is property of the estate, or became 
entitled to acquire property that would be property of the estate, and 
knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of or entitlement 
to such property, or to deliver or surrender such property to the Official 
Assignee;  
(3) the debtor committed an act specified in subsection (a)(6) of this section; 
or  
(d) The Official Assignee or a creditor may request a revocation of a discharge—  
(1) under subsection (c)(1) of this section within one year after such discharge is 
granted; or  
(2) under subsection (c)(2) or (c)(3) of this section before the later of—  
(A) one year after the granting of such discharge; and  
(B) the date the case is closed.  
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This suggested wording focuses an express list of grounds for refusal to grant 
discharge or for retrospectively cancelling a discharge that was obtained through the 
dishonesty of the bankrupt. By focussing the grounds for refusal on the honesty and 
morality of the bankrupt the grounds for refusal are limited. Such a system would 
result in an honest bankrupt being eligible for discharge while dishonest bankrupts 
would remain undischarged. This system is not designed to be punitive but has its 
foundations based on protection of the public and business community. If the 
dishonesty that formed the basis of the refusal to grant discharge was criminal then 
such instances could be prosecuted. Any conviction for such an act of dishonesty 
would have a sentence that would be punitive. A system of tandem incentives and 
punitive remedies should act as the proverbial carrot and the stick to encourage 
compliance with the regime.  
 
A liquidated bankruptcy with an immediate discharge is argued as being a 
useful tool for all stakeholders. Bankrupt estates that have no assets or with assets that 
have or will be easily realised but will still result in no prospect of a dividend should 
be quickly dealt with to ease congestion within the system. Focus can then be given to 
bankrupt estates that require a level of management and value extraction. The New 
Zealand Insolvency and Trustee Service does not keep records of the percentage of 
cases where a dividend is paid. However they can confirm that the Official Assignee 
distributed dividends of $14,753,627.10 to creditors in the year ending 30 June 
2013.210  Bankrupts who have conducted their affairs without misconduct will enjoy 
the rehabilitative relief from discharge sooner, thereby encouraging sound and 
positive behaviour. Those bankrupts that have acted recklessly or have committed an 
act of misconduct will face a longer period before discharge. Creditors benefit from 
the knowledge that the matter has been fully investigated by the Official Assignee and 
can have confidence in the outcome. The public interest and commercial morality are 
both protected through the incentive of early discharge for those that conduct their 
affairs well. Those bankrupts guilty of some form of misconduct are denied the relief 
of discharge until the traditional three year period has elapsed or until the court orders 
its discharge, whichever is the longer. The only potential risk to the optimal operation 
of this suggested alternative is if the Official Assignee fails to exercise their duties 
correctly. If a question arose as to the correctness of the discretion granted to the 
Official Assignee under these provisions, the matter could be resolved by the Court. 
 
This change to the discharge provisions should not be viewed as a punitive 
measure for bankrupts that do not conduct their affairs well. Instead it should be 
                                                 
210 Insolvency and Trustee Service Insolvency Statistics and Debtor Profile Report (1 July 2012 to 30 
June 2013) at page 7. Able to be viewed at http://www.insolvency.govt.nz/cms/site-tools/about-
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viewed as a reward for those that do conduct their affairs well, thereby encouraging 
all individuals to be vigilant in conducting their financial affairs. 
 
N Traditional Three Year Discharge 
 
This is not a proposed new alternative, in fact it is the status quo for all 
insolvencies that enter the personal insolvency gateway and for whatever reason fail 
to be shepherded down a different path. As noted above this traditional bankruptcy is 
not a punitive measure in itself, it just means that an individual does not qualify for 
early discharge. If the Official Assignee wants to impose punitive or public protection 
type conditions on a bankrupt, then that would be deemed to be a punitive measure 
because of the bankrupt’s previous bad acts. 
 
In many cases it is accepted that the traditional bankruptcy will not yield a 
greater return for creditors. This in itself is not an issue, for it is suggested that the 
benefit is the incentive to conduct ones affairs better in the first place. Further where 
external factors have hampered a bankrupt from being financially stable, a longer 
bankruptcy term can allow time for such stability to be found. Australia, which is 
arguably the closest jurisdiction to New Zealand also has a three year bankruptcy 
before discharge. When Australia used an immediate discharge model there were no 
floodgates opening to increased insolvency numbers. There was also as discussed by 
John King no empirical reason why bankruptcy should last any particular length.211 
Further there appears to be no reason for the removal of the immediate discharge 
provisions. Traditional bankruptcy is still the option of last resort, and it is suggested 
that the model of a personal administration proposal will in fact have strong uptake 
and will be the insolvent’s preferred alternative.  
 
 
 
VIII Personal Administration 
 
Personal administration will be championed as the best solution for the 
majority of insolvents who wish to avoid bankruptcy but are still unable to meet their 
financial commitments. There is recognition that the liquidated bankruptcy models 
discussed above, with immediate discharge and traditional discharge, fail to provide a 
solution in all insolvency situations. This failure of the current system to recognise the 
key purposes of an insolvency regime from a stakeholder’s perspective will be used to 
support the need for insolvency reform. The pre-bankruptcy area of insolvency will be 
advanced as being the key area for reform. The reform recommendation advanced to 
achieve an optimal regime is personal administration, thus; using Korobkins’ ‘critical 
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reform’ that “critical claims about [insolvency] purposes are [the] framework for 
reform.”212 The framework suggested in this section is that of personal administration.  
 
The concept of personal administration as advocated in this paper will be 
discussed and described with the process outlined in a step-by-step manner. Then the 
system of personal administration will be critiqued from the perspective of each of the 
identified stakeholders. Finally, this section will conclude with an analysis of personal 
administration using the economic theories, balanced approach and utilitarian 
framework as already outlined. 
 
A The Concept of Personal Administration 
 
In 2006 New Zealand brought in the first legislated alternatives to bankruptcy 
with the introduction of the ‘No Asset Procedure’213. This option provided for the first 
time, a meaningful alternative to bankruptcy (if insolvents met the prescribed criteria). 
At the same time, the Companies Act 1993 was also was amended to include 
provision for ‘Voluntary Administration’214.  
 
These two changes showed a shift in attitude by the legislature away from a 
punitive insolvency regime towards a rehabilitative one. Whilst these reforms have 
not gone anywhere near as far as reforms in other jurisdictions they clearly signal a 
new approach. These reforms have not gone anywhere near as far as the 
recommendations made by the Ministry of Economic Development.215 They have 
however clearly demonstrated a change in attitude by the legislature. This new 
approach for personal insolvency allows individuals the ability to deal with their 
personal debts in a manner that does not attach the moral stigma of bankruptcy to the 
individual while still offering them a ‘clean slate’. From a corporate perspective 
voluntary administration “provides for the administration of the business and affairs 
of insolvent or near insolvent companies”216 
 
The provision of alternatives that do not contain the words ‘bankruptcy’ or 
‘liquidation’ is a major advance on the historical treatment of insolvents. The new 
options have become more acceptable to the public morality because of the lack of 
labels attached to them. These alternatives to bankruptcy may achieve the same result 
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in terms of creditor returns without the insolvent having the stigma of being labelled a 
bankrupt. 
 
The corporate model of voluntary administration provides, according to Heath 
and Whale:217 
 
The administrator of a company has control of its business property and affairs 
while it is under administration (s 239U(a)). He or she, as the company’s agent 
(s 239W) may carry on its business, manage its property and affairs, close its 
business, sell any of its property and otherwise perform any function or exercise 
any power which the company or any of its officers could have exercised had 
the company not been under administration. 
 
Voluntary administration is entered into on a voluntary basis by the directors 
of a company. There exist only two options for a company that has entered voluntary 
administration, liquidation or release back to its directors. For directors there is an 
incentive for placing a company in the hands of an administrator, in that the company 
may be able to be rehabilitated without the directors incurring personal liability from 
risking insolvent trading.   
 
B The Process of Personal Administration 
 
1 Entry 
 
The proposed system of personal insolvency as outlined above would be a 
compulsory precursor to bankruptcy or personal administration. There would be two 
clearly defined entry points to personal insolvency, either an insolvent has filed a 
petition with the Official Assignee or an insolvent has committed an ‘act of 
bankruptcy’ by failing to comply with a ‘bankruptcy notice’218. On the occurrence of 
either of these events the insolvent would automatically enter personal insolvency. 
This would immediately take away any need for a creditor to incur the additional 
costs associated with petitioning the court for adjudication. It would also remove the 
often long drawn-out process associated with insolvents trying to piece together 
compositions or compromises under the 2006 Act219. Instead personal administration 
would provide mechanisms for the insolvent to present proposals to creditors. 
 
On entry to personal insolvency the insolvent’s property would vest in the 
Official Assignee in a similar manner to bankruptcy220. This vesting would only be a 
temporary measure while the Official Assignee assessed the insolvent’s situation and 
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prepared a report to creditors. There would be only three possible outcomes to a 
personal insolvency; either bankruptcy, personal administration or release (if it was 
found the debtor was not insolvent).  
 
Adopting an administrative gateway system to bankruptcy, potentially adds an 
additional layer of expense to the administration of insolvent estates. It will be argued 
that some additional expense will be offset by the savings to creditors in no longer 
having to petition the Court. Public protection from the further dealings of insolvents 
also provides an intangible benefit to society as a whole. In the case of Henderson. ex 
parte Commissioner of Inland Revenue221 the Court emphasised this public protection 
aspect. 
 
2 Statement of affairs 
 
There would be an immediate requirement for a ‘Statement of Affairs’222 to be 
filed by the insolvent (as is currently required in a bankruptcy situation) and it would 
be compulsory to file within time frames specified in the Act223. 
 
From the statement of affairs the Official Assignee would be able to determine 
the total indebtedness of the insolvent, the assets of the insolvent and the security of 
any creditor. The Official Assignee would then search the various security registers to 
identify any registered priorities. The Official Assignee would also be able to 
determine which parties or entities are related to the insolvent. 
 
It is important at this point that the Official Assignee scrutinises each creditor 
and puts them to proof of their debt. This is an important step as it filters any potential 
circumvention of the process through stacking the deck with ‘fictitious creditors’. The 
case of Henderson. ex parte Commissioner of Inland Revenue224 is an example of 
where, amongst other reasons, unproven debts and liabilities were rejected by the 
Court, even though on the surface the numbers supported ratification of the proposal.  
 
At this point the Official Assignee would interview the insolvent, with a view 
to answering any questions raised in the statement of affairs. The Official Assignee 
would then be obliged to explain the options to the insolvent (the options being 
bankruptcy or personal administration). Insolvents currently can only access proposals 
or compositions as alternatives to place before the Court, however very few do so. 
The main reason for this appears to be lack of legal representation by insolvents at 
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bankruptcy proceedings. This implies that most insolvents are not able to access legal 
advice on their options prior to bankruptcy court.   
 
The Official Assignee would then report to creditors based on the information 
outlined above. 
 
 
 
3. Official assignees report 
 
The Official Assignee’s report would include details of the likely distribution 
from any bankruptcy including an estimate of the Official Assignee’s expected costs. 
It would also contain any proposal that the insolvent wished to make. 
 
The Official Assignee’s role would be to report on the facts discovered from 
the statement of affairs and its enquiries and also report the facts contained in any 
proposal. It is expected that the Official Assignee will be involved in the development 
of the proposal. The Official Assignee’s involvement will ensure that the proposal is 
the best offer that the insolvent can put before creditors. The Official Assignee will 
only place a proposal before creditors if the Official Assignee believes that the 
proposal should be approved. Conversely the Official Assignee should not allow a 
proposal to be presented to creditors that it does not support. If a personal 
administration proposal is presented the Official Assignee is obliged to inform the 
creditors of the alternative should the proposal be rejected. In most cases it is assumed 
that the alternative will be a liquidated bankruptcy with no dividend and immediate 
discharge.  
 
If the Official Assignee suspects misconduct, fraud or dishonesty on the part 
of the insolvent it must not report to the creditors until these matters have been 
investigated. If any such conduct is discovered the Official Assignee has an obligation 
to report it to the creditors and must place the insolvent immediately into traditional 
bankruptcy.  
 
4. Creditors meeting 
 
Within a finite practical time frame (which will largely depend on the size of 
the insolvency and the number of creditors and other parties involved) the Official 
Assignee must call a creditors meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to hold a vote 
on the proposal if one has been presented by the insolvent. Voting would be a largely 
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symbolic exercise as the Official Assignee would have the power to automatically 
approve the personal administration proposal under the following criteria: 
 
 The personal administration proposal was set to last 36 months; 
The personal administration proposal allowed for at least 90% of the 
insolvent’s after legitimate expenses income being contributed to the proposal; 
or 
The insolvent added assets to the pool that would not have been available to 
creditors, in a value of not less than 5c in the dollar of accepted proven debts; 
or 
The total return to creditors from all sources is greater than 10c in the dollar of 
accepted proven debts. 
  
On these bases it is reasonable for the Official Assignee to push through the 
personal administration proposal because it yields a better outcome for the general 
body of creditors. However the vote should still take place so the Official Assignee 
can ascertain the response and feedback from creditors. Voting would be able to be 
done via postal ballot for those creditors that opt not to attend the meeting.  
 
The proposed model does not include any provision for a cram-down 
mechanism to be incorporated as mandatory. Instead the personal administration 
program is flexible to allow any and all eventualities. If insolvents with the support of 
the Official Assignee want to present a creditor cram-down scenario contained within 
the personal administration proposal, they could do so. If such a proposal was 
endorsed by the Official Assignee then it could also be forced upon creditors.  
 
In the development phase of the model of a personal administration proposal, 
the thesis was going to take the approach that the creditor vote acted as a veto on an 
unpopular proposal. However after examining overseas jurisdictions, it appears that 
jurisdictions where the local trustee has the power to approve an insolvency proposal 
the systems run substantially more efficiently. A good example of such jurisdiction is 
the French model.225 As such the model has developed to allow the Official Assignee 
the power to force a personal administration proposal to be approved. 
 
Voting is still an important aspect of the process so creditors feel involved in 
the process. Voting would be on a simple majority basis of 50% based on value of the 
debt or by simple majority of 50% on number of creditors. This threshold is lower 
than in the current Act and its predecessors. Although the voting is now symbolic 
only and its result have no legal effect, it still engages the creditor in the process and 
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creates closure for them. Including the creditors is a deliberate move designed to 
promote better education of insolvency procedures so creditors can in the future better 
manage their debtors.  
 
The current system whereby the minority of creditors (often just one) applies 
to the Court for an adjudication of an insolvent, does not recognise the interests of the 
balance of creditors who are not party to the court proceedings. Although the fate of 
the insolvent now lies exclusively with the Official Assignee it is important to engage 
creditors in the process. Thus personal administration provides an element of natural 
justice in that all stakeholders are involved in the process even if they do not have 
ultimate control over the outcome. 
  
If during the voting phase creditors bring new evidence to the attention of the 
Official Assignee that alters its view on the personal administration proposal, the 
Official Assignee is able to withdraw its support of the proposal and instead bankrupt 
the insolvent using one of the two previously discussed bankruptcy models.  
 
5. Official assignee must approve the personal administration proposal 
 
Although the Official Assignee is the party with the sole power to approve or 
reject a proposal, before they approve the proposal it should be required to see 
whether the proposal is acceptable to creditors, as per the proposed amendment. It is 
suggested that the model for such a check list be similar to that of section 333226. The 
suggested amendment would be worded as follows: 
 
Official Assignee must approve proposal 
(1) The Official Assignee must, before 
approving a proposal, hear any objection 
that is made by or on behalf of a creditor. 
(2) The Official Assignee may refuse to 
approve the proposal if it considers that— 
(a) the provisions of this subpart 
have not been complied with; or 
(b) the terms of the proposal are 
not reasonable or are not 
calculated to benefit the general 
body of creditors; or 
(c) for any reason it is not 
expedient that the proposal be 
approved. 
(3) When it approves the proposal, the 
Official Assignee may correct any formal 
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or accidental error or omission, but must 
not alter the substance of the proposal. 
 
 
This process would also allow any creditors who did not approve the proposal 
to state their objections to the Official Assignee. If the Official Assignee still 
approved the proposal it would bind all of the insolvent’s creditors regardless of 
whether they voted for or against the proposal. 
C Judicial Support 
 
New Zealand courts see proposals or compositions put before them in two 
distinct circumstances, either prior to bankruptcy or post-bankruptcy. The proposals 
made prior to bankruptcy are made under sections 325 to 339227, while the 
compositions made during bankruptcy are made under sections 312 to 324228.  Neither 
of these alternatives feature in the statistics published by the Insolvency and Trustee 
Service. Part of the reason for this is the use of both mechanisms has historically been 
very limited. Most individuals once bankrupt accept their situation and see no merit in 
advancing a composition. The majority of those who do try to advance a composition 
do so unsuccessfully. 
 
Proposals have historically been the domain of the super wealthy or 
professionals whose income is tied into their ability to be able to continue to work. 
The vast majority of these cases involve commercial and business insolvencies. The 
sums involved are also substantial. Many of the proposals made under Part 5 involve 
parties that are related to the insolvent or at least have a substantial investment in the 
outcome of the proceedings. Cases like Henderson229 involve substantial sums, in that 
case over one hundred million dollars. Many of the creditors who supported the 
proposal held securities and were going to benefit from other substantial related 
transactions that Mr Henderson had relating to other developments. 
 
It is also recognised that proposals can be used as a mechanism to allow an 
insolvent to continue to trade or operate in a profession, where if they were bankrupt 
they would not be able to. In the case of Re Webb230 a former lawyer advanced a 
proposal which was approved by all creditors including the IRD and the New Zealand 
Law Society. By approving the proposal Mr Webb was able to to leave New Zealand 
to work in the Bahrain as a tutor and was able to make payments to his creditors over 
three years that resulted in a dividend of 100% to priority creditors and 36% to 
                                                 
227 Insolvency Act 2006, ss 325 -339. 
228 Sections 312 – 324. 
229 Henderson, ex parte Commissioner for Inland Revenue (2011) 25 NZTC 20-049. 
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unsecured creditors. At the time when the proposal was approved Mr Webb had assets 
of only $5,000 and so his creditors would have suffered a complete loss. Likewise the 
case of Re Meyer231 a real estate agent who got involved in a failed commercial 
property development through the association of the partner was able to have a 
proposal approved. This again allowed Ms Meyer the ability to continue in her role as 
a leading real estate sales person so that she could make repayments to creditors under 
the part 5 proposal.  
 
The Court has generally adopted a pragmatic view that if the proposal is 
supported by creditors using their commercial acumen then the court should trust their 
decision. This point has been reinforced in the recent appeal case of Herbert v New 
Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd232 which quoted this passage from Re Bennetts233 
 
 … Rather than it being for the proponents of a scheme to show that it 
ought to be approved, I think the Court should accept the view of the 
creditors, or the majority of them, and grant approval unless it is apparent 
that one of the grounds for refusing approval exists. The Court is clearly 
required to exercise its independent judgment, for considerations of 
wider public interest are relevant, and therefore even unanimity amongst 
the creditors will not be predeterminative of approval. But unless it is 
clear that the creditors generally would fare better under a bankruptcy, 
approval ought normally to be given unless other special circumstances 
militate against it. Whilst a proposal ought not to be imposed upon 
dissentient creditors if that would be advantageous to them as members 
of the general body of creditors their dissent should not be upheld if to do 
so could be prejudicial to the general body of creditors.  
 
Although the suggested model of personal administration gives the Official 
Assignee the power to approve even an unpopular proposal, the Official Assignee 
does still have to hold a vote and allow creditors the opportunity to object to the 
proposal. If creditors in the majority reject the personal administration proposal and 
offer valid reason for their objections, the Official Assignee can, if it sees merit, alter 
its view and remove its support of the proposal. However if the Official Assignee is 
not swayed by the arguments of creditors then it can still force the proposal through. 
 
D Secured Creditors 
Secured creditors have always held a unique position within any insolvency 
regime. They are affected by the situation but their actual exposure is not known as 
the underlying security has not had its value tested in the marketplace. Therefore the 
potential loss is unable to be quantified. This in part explains why secured creditors 
have had their respective voting rights fixed under Part 5 proposals at the total debt at 
                                                 
231 Re Meyer [2013] NZHC 399. 
232 Herbert v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd [2012] NZCA 442 at 27. 
233 Re Bennetts HC Christchurch B138/81; M306/81, 1 February 1982 at 9 
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the time when the proposal is filed with the Court.234 If assets are subsequently sold or 
disposed of either by the creditor or the insolvent and the debt is reduced accordingly 
the voting rights are not amended unless the proposal is amended. 
 
As discussed earlier one of the most powerful provisions of Chapter 11 is the 
ability of the insolvent to retain their home.235 If a property was owned by a family 
trust which are prevalent in New Zealand, and the trust assets were beyond the scope 
of the Official Assignee, then the insolvent could legitimately rent the property from 
the trust and this rent could be used by the trust to meet mortgage payments. If the 
property was in the personal name of the insolvent then depending on the level of 
equity and if the property was owned in sole, joint or as tenants in common, the result 
would be assessed on a case by case basis. If the cost of realising the insolvent’s share 
in the property was going to yield little or no return to creditors then there would be 
no point including the sale of the property as part of the proposal. Equally if a family 
member or some other third party was prepared to contribute funds into the personal 
administration which would not form part of the insolvent’s bankrupt estate, they 
could do so on the express condition that the equity in the property was not to be 
pursued.  
 
Ultimately it is up to the insolvent and the Official Assignee to work together 
to develop a plan that maximises the return to creditors that is over and above what 
they would hope to receive through a liquidated bankruptcy. 
 
E Theoretical Support 
The humanitarian approach, the economic approach and the balanced 
approach and their associated theories all support the rehabilitation of insolvents 
although they reach this conclusion by differing methods the outcome is nevertheless 
one of support. It is argued that personal administration would be supported by all of 
these approaches. 
 
The humanitarian approach has previously criticised the lack of alternatives 
within insolvency regimes.236 Under the proposed amendments of immediate 
discharge and personal administration two new tools are added for dealing with 
insolvency. The power of the personal administration model is that the insolvent is 
able to keep working and remain a productive member of society during their 
personal administration. Further the insolvent is incentivised to increase their 
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production as they personally are able to keep more while still satisfying their 
obligations to creditors.  
 
The humanitarian approach supports the concept of personal administration, 
firstly by increasing the production and self worth of the insolvent during the 
administration and secondly by allowing them a clean slate release from their 
obligations at the conclusion of the administration.  
  
The economic approach as advocated by Jackson supports the view that a 
debtor borrows against their future income in order to maintain a constant level of 
consumption. The issue with bankruptcy is that in many cases the bankrupt’s future 
income ceases to be able to be included. Further the bankrupt is not incentivised to 
maximise their income. Under personal administration both these limitations are 
overcome. The insolvent during administration is able to contribute their income into 
their insolvent estate, thereby satisfying this principal of the economic approach. 
Further by the insolvent contributing a greater amount than would otherwise be 
returned from a bankruptcy the insolvent is aiding is keeping the cost of credit down 
for the entire community, in that it is a feature of the economic theory that the cost of 
credit has priced in the potential cost of bankruptcy or loss. A system where it is easy 
to escape form credit obligations results in credit being more expensive. Under 
personal administration the incidence of return of funds borrowed thereby reduces the 
cost of credit because losses are mitigated. 
 
The balanced approach as discussed by King is focused on the balancing of 
the competing interest of the divergent stakeholders. Value maximisation goes beyond 
the simple dollar value directly extracted from a debtor in an insolvency for the 
benefit of the creditors. Wider considerations such as the rehabilitation of the 
insolvent and their motivated return to the workforce/employment have wider benefits 
to society in general. If an insolvent enters into a personal administration then they are 
already contributing to their creditors more than would otherwise be available through 
their bankrupt estate. The purpose of personal administration is to provide a larger 
pool of assets to creditors than would otherwise be available. This by default has to 
support value maximisation for the stakeholders. 
 
The insolvent also benefits from the personal administration through not 
incurring the stigma of bankruptcy. Also the insolvent may, depending on the nature 
of the plan, be able to retain significant property that would otherwise form part of 
their bankrupt estate. The public have confidence in the robust nature of the system 
because it is operated and sanctioned by the Official Assignee. The moral public and 
the business community are satisfied that the insolvent has undergone examination 
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prior to entering into personal administration, thereby alleviating the risk of a 
dishonest insolvent receiving a benefit under the scheme. 
 
Personal administration also satisfies Kalder-Hicks in that the financial value 
extracted from the insolvent is maximised through the administration process. 
Personal administration is therefore Kalder-Hicks efficient. 
 
 
 
F. Examples of Personal Administration 
 
The mechanics of the proposed reforms of personal insolvency and personal 
administration are set out in this section. A debtor or creditor petition causes the 
insolvent to pass into personal insolvency. Once in personal insolvency the individual 
provides a statement of affairs to the Official Assignee. After an examination of the 
insolvent the Official Assignee would shepherd the insolvent down one of the three 
paths of either personal administration, liquidated bankruptcy with immediate 
discharge or liquidated bankruptcy with traditional discharge. The existing 
alternatives of proposals, summary instalment orders and no asset procedures are still 
all retained as alternatives for pre-personal insolvency intervention.  
 
Now that the proposed model of personal administration has been explained it 
is important to see how different scenarios would play out under this model and 
compare the results to the status quo. 
 
1. Example 1 – Consumer Insolvent 
 
This first example provides for a new immigrant to New Zealand. They are 
skilled and are able to earn a solid income in the IT sector as an independent 
contractor. They have emigrated from South Africa and have arrived in New Zealand 
with no assets but strong income. They own no real estate but have acquired a range 
of consumer chattels on finance and credit card. Because of their strong earning 
capacity they find access to credit easy.  
 
The insolvent fails to make adequate provision for income tax as a contractor. 
The insolvent changes their employment status and becomes an employee, doing the 
same work for a solid fixed salary. The Commissioner for Inland Revenue issues 
proceedings and a garnishing order is made against the insolvent’s wages. The 
insolvent now has no capacity to maintain the cost of their financial commitments. 
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They owe the Commissioner a priority debt of $20,000 and consumer finance 
companies another $80,000. The value of the second hand chattels is negligible.  
 
Under a traditional bankruptcy model the insolvent would be adjudicated 
bankrupt by debtor petition and all creditors would suffer a complete loss. It is also 
likely that the bankrupt will probably immigrate again to Australia at the first 
opportunity to restart their life again afresh. Personal administration works very well 
for this individual. They have a solid reliable income stream which they are able to 
use to contribute to their personal administration. They have no assets that have any 
realisable value so no assets are sold instead regular payments are made over a period 
of 36 months by the insolvent. At the conclusion of the administration the insolvent is 
released with a clean slate and no lingering bankruptcy on their record. They are free 
to continue to make a new life in New Zealand and their creditors have received back 
a considerable portion of their debt.  
 
2. Example 2- Consumer Insolvent Who Suffers a Health Problem 
An average kiwi worker employed on an average wage of $50,000, suffers a 
heart attack in his mid-forties and has to take a year off work to recover. The 
individual owns their own home jointly with their wife with a mortgage at 80% of the 
value of the property which is valued at $300,000. The insolvent also has vehicle 
finance and credit card debt of $25,000. The wife does work and she earns $35,000 
per annum. As a family they cannot meet all their finance costs and living costs. In the 
first instance they prioritise repayment of the mortgage but are unable to maintain this 
on the single income. They obtain a mortgage holiday from their bank which lasts for 
three months, at the conclusion of this they are unable to meet their financial 
commitments. The house is subsequently sold at mortgage sale with an additional loss 
of another $30,000. 
 
Under the current law bankruptcy would again yield no dividend. It is also 
clear that this debtor has not committed any act of dishonesty and it is just bad luck 
that they find themselves in this situation. 
 
In this situation personal administration would not be the best tool to use. It 
would make far more sense for this insolvent to be bankrupted with immediate 
discharge from the personal insolvency. There is no prospect that this insolvent would 
be able to offer any financial benefit to creditors because of the uncertainty over his 
health issues. Further this situation deserves the immediate relief that immediate 
discharge with no further obligations brings. 
 
3. Example 3 – The Failed Business 
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A businessman who has previously been moderately successful suffers a 
relationship breakdown and has to borrow additional funds to buy out his former 
partner from relationship property including his business, house and chattels. On legal 
advice post division of relationship property the businessman places his house in a 
family trust and commences a legitimate gifting program. The recession hits and the 
business becomes insolvent and is closed down leaving creditors out of pocket for the 
sum of $250,000 which the businessman has personally guaranteed. The trust has a 
mortgage on the $500,000 house for $250,000. It is accepted by the Official Assignee 
that the trust assets would not form part of the insolvents estate should bankruptcy 
ensue. The business man is able to find new employment earning $60,000. The 
businessman has some new ideas and would like to set up a new business at some 
point in the future. 
 
Under the current bankruptcy regime the insolvent would be bankrupted over 
the personal guarantees. His trust assets would remain beyond the reach of the 
Official Assignee and his creditors would suffer a complete loss. As an undischarged 
bankrupt no matter how sound the new business idea was the businessman could not 
set up the business. 
 
Under personal administration the insolvent could if he wanted to, borrow 
money from the trust and use it to pay his creditors a lump sum of say $50,000. Since 
these are funds that the creditors would not be able to benefit from in a liquidated 
bankruptcy it is likely that the Official Assignee would recommend the approval of 
such a proposal. The businessman would then be free to advance his new business 
venture if he so wanted.  
 
 
4. Summary of Examples 
Under all of the examples mentioned above, all creditors ended up in at least 
as good a position as they would have been under a traditional bankruptcy. The 
insolvents all ended up in a preferable position. In example 2, even in situations where 
there is no possibility of a dividend, the insolvent had the opportunity to be 
discharged from his debts immediately, there being no reason for him to not be 
discharged. 
 
More options and flexibility that an insolvency regime can contain leads to 
better outcomes for all stakeholders. Creditors receiving a higher dividend is a 
positive outcome. Insolvents able to be incentivised to perform as active members of 
society and to earn and retain any extra wealth they produce is also a positive. Those 
in unfortunate situations, where honest intentions lead to losses being suffered with no 
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act of dishonesty, should be able to be discharged from their obligations quickly so 
they can work on improving their situation without the millstone of unaffordable 
financial obligations.  
 
 
 
 
 
IX Conclusion 
 
New Zealand does have an insolvency regime that has had some positive 
amendments made to it with the Insolvency Act 2006 improvements. The Ministry of 
Economic Development reports237 that led to the development of the 2006 Act did 
recognise the short comings of the previous legislation. Unfortunately many of the 
recommendations failed to eventuate in the final legislation. It is this absence of 
viable alternatives that restricts New Zealand’s insolvency systems. 
 
International trends along with New Zealand statistics have indicated that 
insolvency is increasing the domain of over indebted consumers. Therefore any 
recommendations for amendment need to be advanced in a framework that targets this 
group. International trends also supported a general relaxing of the entry criteria to 
insolvency systems. The historical link between morality and insolvency has been 
broken and insolvency has been recognised as a social problem that needs addressing. 
Systems focusing on insolvent rehabilitation that have ease of access coupled with a 
fresh start on discharge are argued as the best model. Immediate discharge for the 
honest insolvent is developed as the best mechanism where bankruptcy is 
unavoidable. 
 
Bankruptcy should have alternatives. The alternative of personal 
administration has been developed and advanced in this paper as the best alternative 
to bankruptcy, in that it provides a great value to all stakeholders. Some of the value is 
quantifiable like the dollar return to creditors. However some of the value is nebulous 
like the benefit to the insolvent of not being bankrupt but still valuable. Personal 
administration provides for a non-bankruptcy solution that is flexible enough to be 
developed around the profile of each insolvent applicant. The proposed model of 
personal administration run in conjunction with an insolvency gateway as described 
provides for a model that is efficient in regards to Kalder-Hick and fits within the 
accepted ideals of the balanced, economic and humanitarian approaches and theories.   
 
                                                 
237  
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The model of personal administration advanced in this piece is a theoretical 
model but it is based on extracts from various real world systems. The use of the 
Official Assignee over the Court to manage the program and debtor and creditor 
interests, comes from the French system. The US Chapter 13 provides from the 
mechanism for cram-down as a potential option and provides the basis for an 
insolvent being able to retain assets through making additional contributions to their 
estate. Many of the mechanical steps of compositions are already and have 
historically been part of New Zealand law, thereby creating a normative backdrop to 
these recommended amendments. Finally the Ministry of Economic Development 
made a number of suggestions in its reports on insolvency law reform. Many of these 
reform components feature as part of the model of personal administration.  
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